(编者按:《华尔街疯人日记》(Memoirs of a Minyan)是财经信息网站Minyanville.com创始人托德•哈里森(Todd Harrison)的回忆录。Harrison讲述了他从摩根士丹利交易员到对冲基金合伙人再到网络媒体人的职业生涯,冷眼剖析了华尔街对金钱的错误崇拜。从7月6日起,《华尔街日报》中文网将每天刊登其中的一个章节,敬请关注。点击阅读已发表章节。)新官上任这里的一切看上去都很奇怪。我们每天积极地对4亿美元的组合进行交易,用手工计算损益,正式的数字以及交易错误记录将在第二天下午由高盛发过来。我们的办公室在福尔顿街(Fulton Street)40号,紧邻布鲁克林大桥(Brooklyn Bridge)。公司有十几个全职员工,其中三个直接归我管。他们为吉姆和杰夫执行交易指令,每人都有六位数的薪水;以我在华尔街的从业经历来看,这似乎太挥霍了一点。在几个月内,我促成了一些变化。那几个交易员被更具交易技能的年轻人换掉了,新来的人底薪更低,但只要业绩好,上不封顶。我们安装了顶尖的风险管理系统,能够实时监控交易情况,对各种可能的情况进行“压力测试”。我和券商的交易负责人见面,说明佣金将与他们的交易建议以及提供的流动性挂钩起来。在公司内部管理和外界关系维护上,我们奉行精英主义,对工作标准的要求高,但对人公平,依法合规办事。我们的处事方法很快传了开来,公司高速运转,就像一台上足了油的机器。当分析师调整对某只股票的评级时,券商总是第一个给我们打电话,他们的首席交易员会跟我沟通其主要账户的交易趋势,而我也总是很快地告诉他们自己的市场观点,从而建立良好的互信关系。在沟通时,我尽量做到“己所不欲,勿施于人”,总是说清楚交易原因,很少因为自身的交易给他们造成损失。如果交易指令正好跟他们撞车,我们就会自觉地调整价格。我的祖父曾经说过,我们唯一拥有的就是自己的名字和承诺。Cramer, Berkowitz公司交易部门就是这一原则的直接延伸。下节预告:挥棒失误
New kid in townIt all seemed very strange. We actively traded $400 million and calculated the profit or loss by hand each day. The actual number, along with trade errors, arrived from Goldman Sachs the very next afternoon.Our offices were on 40 Fulton Street, adjacent to the Brooklyn Bridge. There were a dozen or so full-time employees, including three clerks directly under my charge. They each made six-figure salaries for executing orders on behalf of Jim and Jeff. That seemed extravagant, given my experience on the street.Within a few months, I ushered through several changes. The clerks were replaced with young guns that had skill sets accretive to the trading process. Their base salaries were low, but there was no ceiling if we produced.We installed a state-of-the-art risk management system that allowed us to monitor our performance in real time and 'stress test' various market scenarios. I met with the desk heads of our brokers and told them commission would be correlated to their idea generation and the liquidity they provided.It was pure meritocracy, within our walls and with regard to our relationships. We were tough but fair and always operated within the letter of the law. Word of our approach quickly spread and our firm hummed like a well-oiled machine.We got the first call from brokers when analysts changed a rating on a stock. Head traders communicated the directional flow from their most-respected accounts and I was always quick to offer my opinion in an attempt to establish goodwill.We treated people the way I wanted to be treated when I was on the other end of the phone. We always told them why we traded and rarely hurt them with our flow. If we ran over them with one of our orders, we adjusted prices as a matter of course.My grandfather taught me that all we have is our name and our word. The trading operation at Cramer, Berkowitz evolved into a direct extension of that.
New kid in townIt all seemed very strange. We actively traded $400 million and calculated the profit or loss by hand each day. The actual number, along with trade errors, arrived from Goldman Sachs the very next afternoon.Our offices were on 40 Fulton Street, adjacent to the Brooklyn Bridge. There were a dozen or so full-time employees, including three clerks directly under my charge. They each made six-figure salaries for executing orders on behalf of Jim and Jeff. That seemed extravagant, given my experience on the street.Within a few months, I ushered through several changes. The clerks were replaced with young guns that had skill sets accretive to the trading process. Their base salaries were low, but there was no ceiling if we produced.We installed a state-of-the-art risk management system that allowed us to monitor our performance in real time and 'stress test' various market scenarios. I met with the desk heads of our brokers and told them commission would be correlated to their idea generation and the liquidity they provided.It was pure meritocracy, within our walls and with regard to our relationships. We were tough but fair and always operated within the letter of the law. Word of our approach quickly spread and our firm hummed like a well-oiled machine.We got the first call from brokers when analysts changed a rating on a stock. Head traders communicated the directional flow from their most-respected accounts and I was always quick to offer my opinion in an attempt to establish goodwill.We treated people the way I wanted to be treated when I was on the other end of the phone. We always told them why we traded and rarely hurt them with our flow. If we ran over them with one of our orders, we adjusted prices as a matter of course.My grandfather taught me that all we have is our name and our word. The trading operation at Cramer, Berkowitz evolved into a direct extension of that.