Microsoft ASP.NET vulnerability (updated Oct. 7th)
Microsoft announced a possible vulnerability in ASP.NET (http://www.microsoft.com/security/incident/aspnet.mspx ). There are not much details so far, but it refers to the "canonicalization" functionality and suggest to implement then hardening measures outlined in KB887459 (http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=887459 ).
It appears that a particularly crafted request may confuse ASP.Net and allow access to otherwise protected directories.
If a web server receives a request for a particular URL (e.g. _http://server/somedirectory/filename), the 'somedirectory/filename' part has to be mapped to a particular file located on the server. This translation has been the source of many "directory traversal" bugs. The IIS unicode exploit is probably the most famous one.
After our original posting of this diary, a few users pointed to the following articles which provide more details then provided by Microsoft's advisory:
(Thanks to Chaouki & Daniel)
http://www.heise.de/security/news/meldung/51730 (german)
http://www.derkeiler.com/Mailing-Lists/NT-Bugtraq/2004-09/0068.html
http://blogs.devleap.com/rob/archive/2004/10/02/1803.aspx (italian)
http://www.k-otik.com/news/10052004.ASPNETFlaw.php (french)
It appears that by switching a '/' character in the URL with '/' or '%5C', the canonicalization routine will be confused. So if the URL:
http://www.example.com/secure/file.apx
is password protected, using the either of the following URLs will bypass the restriction:
http://www.example.com/secure/file.apx
http://www.example.com/secure%5Cfile.apx
In addition to the slash/back-slash confusion, one reader reports that inserting a space will bypass the URL restriction as well:
http://www.example.com/%20/secure/file.apx
(had no chance to validate this method so far)
突破二级目录
..%5c
Microsoft宣布ASP.NET可能存在漏洞,涉及“规范化”功能。特制请求可能使ASP.Net混淆,允许访问受保护目录。URL中斜杠、反斜杠替换或插入空格可能绕过限制,文中还给出了相关详细信息文章链接。
1103

被折叠的 条评论
为什么被折叠?



