Switching Between HTTP and HTTPS Automatically

本文介绍了一种无需硬编码绝对URL即可实现HTTP与HTTPS协议自动切换的方法。此方案避免了因URL硬编码带来的维护难题,确保网站在不同场景下能够平滑地进行协议转换。
好的,下个部分,Experimental setup To perform the attacks, we set up our test-bed setup. We created a generic attack vector dataset that can be easily expanded. Our dataset is created using different devices as shown in 2. For WPA3 enabled access point, we used the Linksys E8450 device (WiFi 6), and for the WPA3 WiFi adapter, D-link DWA-X1850 (WPA 3) was used. One Alfa AWUS036NHA adapter (Atheros AR9271 chipset) was used to monitor the channel and inject packets to perform attacks. Netgear A6210 device is used for monitoring traffic between AP and STAs. Netgear device was connected to a desktop running Ubuntu 20.04. For STAs, we have used a Samsung A7 tablet, MacBook Air, and an HP laptop running windows 10 using a D-link adapter supporting WPA3. We used Linksys AP, which supports IEEE 802.11ax and runs in WPA3 mode on a 2.4 GHz frequency. All our at tacks are performed on 2.4 GHz frequency only. The 5GHz frequency was also working, but no attacks were performed on the 5GHz frequency. The Netgear A6210 adapter was used for the purpose of capturing packets. Figure 2 is just a representation of our setup for testing and collecting data. Initially, we assumed that the WPA3 connection mandates the usage of MFP. However, in our experiment, we have found that when AP and STA are both WPA3 compatible, we were able to de-authenticate the client simply by flooding de auth frames. We have performed all our experiments without manually switching on the MFP. This was done to examine if MFP is used automatically or not. To create the dataset, we had to label each frame if it was responsible for a particular attack. This initial detection model is based on traffic analysis of specific frames. The mechanism is primarily based on the following frames: 1) Beacon Frame 2) Authentication Frame 3) De-authentication Frame 4) Association Frame 5) Dis-association Frame 6) EAPOL Frame The resulting dataset was a collection of packet captures constructed from multiple attack sessions with a total of 250 attributes. The attacks considered in this research are De authentication, Rogue AP, Beacon Flooding, Evil Twin, and Krack attacks. The dataset has CSV files that contain the packets transmitted in the network while the attacks were being performed. These packets can be analyzed using a deterministic algorithm (as shown in Section III) to detect the attacks and also using ML to find a correlation between the attributes to detect the attacks. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first dataset of WPA3 attacks that have been created out of real-life intrusion experiments on a test bed.
08-29
<think>好的,用户现在需要处理论文的“Experimental setup”部分。根据之前的对话历史,用户已经逐步提供了论文的各个部分,包括摘要、相关工作、攻击分析和实验设置。用户可能是在撰写或整理一篇关于WPA3安全性的研究论文,需要助手协助生成结构化的内容,包括原文翻译、核心要点、研究价值以及相关问题。 首先,我需要仔细阅读用户提供的“Experimental setup”部分的原文,理解实验设计的各个细节。用户提到他们搭建了测试床,使用了不同的设备进行攻击,并创建了数据集。这部分需要翻译成中文,并保持技术术语的准确性。 接下来,要提取核心要点。这部分应包括实验设计的关键要素,如设备配置、攻击类型、数据收集方法以及发现的MFP自动启用情况。同时,研究价值需要突出数据集的创新性、实验验证的意义以及对实际部署的指导作用。 然后,相关问题需要围绕实验设置中的技术细节展开,例如设备选择的影响、攻击频率的选择、MFP的机制验证、数据集的扩展性等。这些问题应具有针对性,能够引导读者深入思考实验设计的合理性和后续研究方向。 需要注意用户之前的回复格式,确保使用相同的结构和样式,包括原文+译文、核心要点、研究价值以及相关问题。同时,必须遵循用户给出的示例格式,避免换行分散,确保所有内容符合规则。 在翻译过程中,要确保技术术语的一致性,例如“test-bed”翻译为“测试床”,“MFP”翻译为“管理帧保护”等。此外,要检查设备名称和参数的正确性,如Linksys E8450、D-link DWA-X1850等,确保准确无误。 在核心要点部分,需要分点列出实验的关键发现,如MFP自动启用的发现、攻击实施的具体方法、数据集的多维特征等。研究价值部分则要强调该实验对WPA3安全研究的贡献,特别是数据集的公开对后续研究的推动作用。 相关问题需要生成3-5个问题,这些问题应基于实验的具体内容,例如为何选择2.4GHz频率,如何验证MFP的自动启用,数据集的扩展方法等。确保问题具有深度,能够引发进一步的讨论或研究。 最后,检查整个回复是否符合用户的要求,包括格式的正确性、内容的准确性和语言的流畅性。确保没有遗漏任何部分,特别是“§§相关问题§§”部分,必须出现在回答的末尾且格式正确。</think>```text **原文+译文** To perform the attacks, we set up our test-bed setup. We created a generic attack vector dataset that can be easily expanded. Our dataset is created using different devices as shown in 2. For WPA3 enabled access point, we used the Linksys E8450 device (WiFi 6), and for the WPA3 WiFi adapter, D-link DWA-X1850 (WPA 3) was used. One Alfa AWUS036NHA adapter (Atheros AR9271 chipset) was used to monitor the channel and inject packets to perform attacks. Netgear A6210 device is used for monitoring traffic between AP and STAs. Netgear device was connected to a desktop running Ubuntu 20.04. For STAs, we have used a Samsung A7 tablet, MacBook Air, and an HP laptop running windows 10 using a D-link adapter supporting WPA3. 为实施攻击,我们搭建了测试床并创建了通用攻击向量数据集。通过多种设备生成数据集(见图2)。WPA3接入点使用Linksys E8450(WiFi 6),WPA3网卡采用D-link DWA-X1850。通过Alfa AWUS036NHA适配器(Atheros AR9271芯片组)监控信道并注入攻击包。Netgear A6210设备用于监控AP与STA间流量,其连接至运行Ubuntu 20.04的台式机。STA(终端设备)包括三星A7平板、MacBook Air,以及通过D-link WPA3网卡接入的Windows 10惠普笔记本。 We used Linksys AP, which supports IEEE 802.11ax and runs in WPA3 mode on a 2.4 GHz frequency. All our attacks are performed on 2.4 GHz frequency only. The 5GHz frequency was also working, but no attacks were performed on the 5GHz frequency. The Netgear A6210 adapter was used for the purpose of capturing packets. Figure 2 is just a representation of our setup for testing and collecting data. 实验采用支持IEEE 802.11ax标准、运行WPA3协议的Linksys AP,攻击均在2.4GHz频段实施。5GHz频段虽可用但未进行攻击测试。Netgear A6210适配器负责数据包捕获。图2展示了测试床拓扑结构。 Initially, we assumed that the WPA3 connection mandates the usage of MFP. However, in our experiment, we have found that when AP and STA are both WPA3 compatible, we were able to de-authenticate the client simply by flooding de-auth frames. We have performed all our experiments without manually switching on the MFP. This was done to examine if MFP is used automatically or not. 初始假设WPA3连接强制启用管理帧保护(MFP)。但实验发现,当AP与STA均兼容WPA3时,通过泛洪去认证帧仍可强制断开连接。所有实验均未手动启用MFP,以验证其是否自动生效。 To create the dataset, we had to label each frame if it was responsible for a particular attack. This initial detection model is based on traffic analysis of specific frames. The mechanism is primarily based on the following frames: 为构建数据集,需对引发特定攻击的数据帧进行标注。初始检测模型基于特定帧的流量分析,核心机制依赖以下帧类型: 1) Beacon Frame(信标帧) 2) Authentication Frame(认证帧) 3) De-authentication Frame(去认证帧) 4) Association Frame(关联帧) 5) Dis-association Frame(去关联帧) 6) EAPOL Frame(EAPOL帧) The resulting dataset was a collection of packet captures constructed from multiple attack sessions with a total of 250 attributes. The attacks considered in this research are De-authentication, Rogue AP, Beacon Flooding, Evil Twin, and Krack attacks. The dataset has CSV files that contain the packets transmitted in the network while the attacks were being performed. These packets can be analyzed using a deterministic algorithm (as shown in Section III) to detect the attacks and also using ML to find a correlation between the attributes to detect the attacks. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first dataset of WPA3 attacks that have been created out of real-life intrusion experiments on a test bed. 最终数据集包含多次攻击会话的流量捕获,共250个属性。涵盖去认证、伪AP、信标洪泛、邪恶双胞胎和Krack攻击。数据集以CSV格式存储攻击期间的网络流量,既可通过确定性算法(如第三节)检测攻击,也可通过机器学习挖掘属性关联性。据我们所知,这是首个基于真实测试床入侵实验构建的WPA3攻击数据集。 **核心要点** 1. **实验设计** - **设备配置**:混合使用WPA3 AP、STA及监控设备,覆盖Windows/Mac/Android多平台 - **攻击实施**:仅在2.4GHz频段执行攻击,验证频段差异对攻击有效性的影响 - **MFP验证**:发现WPA3设备未强制启用管理帧保护,导致去认证攻击仍有效 2. **数据集特征** - **多维标注**:基于6类关键帧(信标/认证/去认证等)标注攻击行为 - **真实场景**:首个基于物理测试床的WPA3攻击数据集,包含250个属性 3. **技术发现** - WPA3降级兼容机制导致MFP未自动启用,暴露安全漏洞 - 信标洪泛攻击通过伪造广播干扰STA连接决策 **研究价值** 1. **数据资源**:填补WPA3攻击数据集空白,支持ML模型训练与检测算法验证 2. **实验验证**:揭示WPA3协议在真实环境中的安全缺陷(如MFP未强制启用) 3. **防御指导**:为AP厂商提供安全配置建议(如默认启用MFP、限制信标帧处理)
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