malloc 分配大堆块(128KB)的一次探索

前言

一次意外执行了 malloc(0x5000),结构使用 gdb 调试发现其分配的位置在 TLS 区域,这令我不解(:最后去看了下 malloc 源码和 mmap 源码实现,发现似乎可能gdb 插件的问题,乐

更新

这里 gdb 插件没错,最近没事重新对 mmap 进行完整的审计,并且编译了一个内核对其进行了简单的调试,发现相同属性的 vma 会进行合并从而减少 vm_area_struct 的内存开销,当然合并的要求还是比较严苛的:

/*
 * Given a mapping request (addr,end,vm_flags,file,pgoff), figure out
 * whether that can be merged with its predecessor or its successor.
 * Or both (it neatly fills a hole).
 *
 * In most cases - when called for mmap, brk or mremap - [addr,end) is
 * certain not to be mapped by the time vma_merge is called; but when
 * called for mprotect, it is certain to be already mapped (either at
 * an offset within prev, or at the start of next), and the flags of
 * this area are about to be changed to vm_flags - and the no-change
 * case has already been eliminated.
 *
 * The following mprotect cases have to be considered, where AAAA is
 * the area passed down from mprotect_fixup, never extending beyond one
 * vma, PPPPPP is the prev vma specified, and NNNNNN the next vma after:
 *
 *     AAAA             AAAA                AAAA          AAAA
 *    PPPPPPNNNNNN    PPPPPPNNNNNN    PPPPPPNNNNNN    PPPPNNNNXXXX
 *    cannot merge    might become    might become    might become
 *                    PPNNNNNNNNNN    PPPPPPPPPPNN    PPPPPPPPPPPP 6 or
 *    mmap, brk or    case 4 below    case 5 below    PPPPPPPPXXXX 7 or
 *    mremap move:                                    PPPPXXXXXXXX 8
 *        AAAA
 *    PPPP    NNNN    PPPPPPPPPPPP    PPPPPPPPNNNN    PPPPNNNNNNNN
 *    might become    case 1 below    case 2 below    case 3 below
 *
 * It is important for case 8 that the vma NNNN overlapping the
 * region AAAA is never going to extended over XXXX. Instead XXXX must
 * be extended in region AAAA and NNNN must be removed. This way in
 * all cases where vma_merge succeeds, the moment vma_adjust drops the
 * rmap_locks, the properties of the merged vma will be already
 * correct for the whole merged range. Some of those properties like
 * vm_page_prot/vm_flags may be accessed by rmap_walks and they must
 * be correct for the whole merged range immediately after the
 * rmap_locks are released. Otherwise if XXXX would be removed and
 * NNNN would be extended over the XXXX range, remove_migration_ptes
 * or other rmap walkers (if working on addresses beyond the "end"
 * parameter) may establish ptes with the wrong permissions of NNNN
 * instead of the right permissions of XXXX.
 */
struct vm_area_struct *vma_merge(struct mm_struct *mm,
			struct vm_area_struct *prev, unsigned long addr,
			unsigned long end, unsigned long vm_flags,
			struct anon_vma *anon_vma, struct file *file,
			pgoff_t pgoff, struct mempolicy *policy,
			struct vm_userfaultfd_ctx vm_userfaultfd_ctx)
{
	pgoff_t pglen = (end - addr) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
	struct vm_area_struct *area, *next;
	int err;

	/*
	 * We later require that vma->vm_flags == vm_flags,
	 * so this tests vma->vm_flags & VM_SPECIAL, too.
	 */
	if (vm_flags & VM_SPECIAL)
		return NULL;

	if (prev)
		next = prev->vm_next;
	else
		next = mm->mmap;
	area = next;
	if (area && area->vm_end == end)		/* cases 6, 7, 8 */
		next = next->vm_next;

	/* verify some invariant that must be enforced by the caller */
	VM_WARN_ON(prev && addr <= prev->vm_start);
	VM_WARN_ON(area && end > area->vm_end);
	VM_WARN_ON(addr >= end);

	/*
	 * Can it merge with the predecessor?
	 */
	if (prev && prev->vm_end == addr &&
			mpol_equal(vma_policy(prev), policy) &&
			can_vma_merge_after(prev, vm_flags,
					    anon_vma, file, pgoff,
					    vm_userfaultfd_ctx)) {
		/*
		 * OK, it can.  Can we now merge in the successor as well?
		 */
		if (next && end == next->vm_start &&
				mpol_equal(policy, vma_policy(next)) &&
				can_vma_merge_before(next, vm_flags,
						     anon_vma, file,
						     pgoff+pglen,
						     vm_userfaultfd_ctx) &&
				is_mergeable_anon_vma(prev->anon_vma,
						      next->anon_vma, NULL)) {
							/* cases 1, 6 */
			err = __vma_adjust(prev, prev->vm_start,
					 next->vm_end, prev->vm_pgoff, NULL,
					 prev);
		} else					/* cases 2, 5, 7 */
			err = __vma_adjust(prev, prev->vm_start,
					 end, prev->vm_pgoff, NULL, prev);
		if (err)
			return NULL;
		khugepaged_enter_vma_merge(prev, vm_flags);
		return prev;
	}

	/*
	 * Can this new request be merged in front of next?
	 */
	if (next && end == next->vm_start &&
			mpol_equal(policy, vma_policy(next)) &&
			can_vma_merge_before(next, vm_flags,
					     anon_vma, file, pgoff+pglen,
					     vm_userfaultfd_ctx)) {
		if (prev && addr < prev->vm_end)	/* case 4 */
			err = __vma_adjust(prev, prev->vm_start,
					 addr, prev->vm_pgoff, NULL, next);
		else {					/* cases 3, 8 */
			err = __vma_adjust(area, addr, next->vm_end,
					 next->vm_pgoff - pglen, NULL, next);
			/*
			 * In case 3 area is already equal to next and
			 * this is a noop, but in case 8 "area" has
			 * been removed and next was expanded over it.
			 */
			area = next;
		}
		if (err)
			return NULL;
		khugepaged_enter_vma_merge(area, vm_flags);
		return area;
	}

	return NULL;
}

场景复现

#include <stdio.h>
int main() {
        malloc(0x5000);
        return 0;
}

调试:
在这里插入图片描述
wtf 不应该啊,这咋能分配到 tls 区域去了呢?

问题探索

通过对 malloc 源码的查看,发现其超过了 mmap_threshold,所有最后走的 mmap 映射的一段私有匿名区域(这里大家应该都很熟悉了)所以不应该分配到 tls 区域去啊,在与 henry 师傅交流后,觉得可能与 mmap 的行为有关,于是说干就干,简单地去审了一下 mmap 的源码,最后发现可能是插件的问题

mmap 源码分析就不写了,我也没做笔记,毕竟是开源的,需要时自己去看看就行了,而且我看完 mmap 源码时已经快凌晨 3 点了,就简单说下 mmap 是如何分配虚拟内存的。在内核态,为进程维护了一颗红黑树,其根据地址组织了空闲的 vma(struct vm_area_struct 结构体表示),而在我的 ubuntu 22.04 上,文件与匿名映射区是从高地址往低地址增长的,所以 mmap 在寻找虚拟内存区域时是从高地址往低地址扫描的

知道这之后一切都可以解释了,简单调试一下,啥也不执行,看下内存布局:把随机化关了,方便调试
在这里插入图片描述
可以看到在 tls 前后存在 0x17e0000x11000 的空间,我们来验证一下:

#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
int main() {
        void *p0 = malloc(0x17e000-0x1000);
        void *p1 = mmap(0, 0x11000, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
        printf("p0: %p\np1: %p\n", p0, p1);
        return 0;
}

我的机器上 mmap_threshold = 128kb,所以 malloc(0x11000-0x1000) 会走 brk,所以这里我直接使用 mmap

关于这里 malloc 分配为啥要减去 0x1000 请自行审计 sysmalloc 源码(大家应该比较熟悉)

调试结果如下:
在这里插入图片描述
可以看到 mmap0x11000 区域就是 tls 下方的区域,malloc0x17e000 就是 tls 前面的那块区域,这里的 gdb 插件把其当作 TLS 了似乎。当然这里可能就是 tls 预留的,我没有具体调试内核,仅仅静态分析了 mmap 的代码。当然我通过分配一些线程局部变量调整了一下 tls 区域的位置,然后也是这样的:

#include <sys/mman.h>
__thread char p0[0x17e000+0x1000];
int main() {
        void *p1 = mmap(0, 0x193000, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
        printf("p0: %p\np1: %p\n", p0, p1);
        return 0;
}

调试结果:
在这里插入图片描述

所以当我们 malloc 超过 0x17e000-0x1000 时,就会在 libc 前面映射一段空间,也就是大家打 CTF 时说的 malloc 一块大堆块,会使用 mmaplibc 前面分配一个堆块,一般网上都是说分配 0x200000,其实自己简单算一算就知道了,验证一下:

#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
int main() {
        void *p0 = malloc(0x17e000);
        printf("p0: %p\n", p0);
        return 0;
}

调试结果如下:
在这里插入图片描述
一切都是吻合的

一个有趣的 demo

这里给大家看一个 demo,感兴趣的可以自行研究下背后的原因

#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>

int show() {
    FILE *maps_file;
    char line[256];
    char pathname[256];

    maps_file = fopen("/proc/self/maps", "r");
    if (maps_file == NULL) {
        perror("Failed to open /proc/self/maps");
        return 1;
    }

    while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), maps_file)) {
        if (sscanf(line, "%*x-%*x %*s %*x %*x:%*x %*u %s", pathname) == 1) {
            if (strcmp(pathname, "[stack]") == 0 || strcmp(pathname, "/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2") == 0) {
                printf("%s", line);
            }
        }
    }

    fclose(maps_file);
    return 0;
}

int main() {
        uint64_t addr;
        show();
        puts("==========================================");
        scanf("%llx", &addr);
        *(uint64_t*)addr = 0xdeadbeef;
        puts("==========================================");
        show();
        return 0;
}

输出如下:
在这里插入图片描述

总结

mmap 的源码还是比较复杂的,我只是看了我感兴趣的部分,有兴趣的同学可以自己去看看源码,本来想说搭建环境调调 mmap 的,最后还是算了,太累了,睡觉了(:

当然这个东西本身连技术都不算,之所以记录一下,也算是回答自己刚开始学习时的一些疑问,记得当时看网上说 malloc 要分配 0x20000 才能够保证分配的空间在 libc 前面,其实根本没有问过自己为什么?也没有想过 mmap 底层是如何进行虚拟内存分配的?

当然其实现在来解决这些问题也挺好的,毕竟有一些基础,如果最开始就去看 mmap 的源码,相信我早就被劝退了

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