Apparmor

root@test:/tmp# cat apparmor-profile-docker-default


#include <tunables/global>


profile docker-default flags=(attach_disconnected,mediate_deleted) {

  #include <abstractions/base>


  network,
  capability,
  file,
  umount,

  # Host (privileged) processes may send signals to container processes.
  signal (receive) peer=unconfined,
  # dockerd may send signals to container processes (for "docker kill").
  signal (receive) peer=unconfined
,
  # Container processes may send signals amongst themselves.
  signal (send,receive) peer=docker-default,


  deny @{PROC}/* w,   # deny write for all files directly in /proc (not in a subdir)
  # deny write to files not in /proc/<number>/** or /proc/sys/**
  deny @{PROC}/{[^1-9],[^1-9][^0-9],[^1-9s][^0-9y][^0-9s],[^1-9][^0-9][^0-9][^0-9]*}/** w,
  deny @{PROC}/sys/[^k]** w,  # deny /proc/sys except /proc/sys/k* (effectively /proc/sys/kernel)
  deny @{PROC}/sys/kernel/{?,??,[^s][^h][^m]**} w,  # deny everything except shm* in /proc/sys/kernel/
  deny @{PROC}/sysrq-trigger rwklx,
  deny @{PROC}/kcore rwklx,

  deny mount,

  deny /sys/[^f]*/** wklx,
  deny /sys/f[^s]*/** wklx,
  deny /sys/fs/[^c]*/** wklx,
  deny /sys/fs/c[^g]*/** wklx,
  deny /sys/fs/cg[^r]*/** wklx,
  deny /sys/firmware/** rwklx,
  deny /sys/kernel/security/** rwklx,


  # suppress ptrace denials when using 'docker ps' or using 'ps' inside a container
  ptrace (trace,read,tracedby,readby) peer=docker-default,

}

如何使用 AppArmor 限制应用的权限-腾讯云开发者社区-腾讯云 (tencent.com)

使用 AppArmor 限制容器对资源的访问 | Kubernetes

runC CVE-2019-16884-欺骗AppArmor分析及其思考_proc_latest_参考 (sohu.com)

https://cloud.google.com/container-optimized-os/docs/how-to/secure-apparmorhttps://stackoverflow.com/questions/39308135/where-is-dockers-apparmor-profile

https://gist.github.com/dalguete/19a9d984e8a749eefaab7ec9aea6be01https://gitlab.com/apparmor/apparmor/-/wikis/QuickProfileLanguage

https://book.hacktricks.xyz/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/docker-security/apparmorQuickProfileLanguage · Wiki · AppArmor / apparmor · GitLab