windows环境下的postgresql14安装timescaledb

1.查看本地postgresql版本

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我本地的postgresql版本是14

2.去timescaledb官网下载对应的版本

链接: https://docs.timescale.com/self-hosted/latest/install/installation-windows/#supported-platforms
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因为我本地是postgreSQL是14,所以我就下载这个链接了

3.安装

3.1先停止本地的postgreSQL

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3.2以右键管理员权限启动setup

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输入y,之后找到postgresql的安装目录下的配置文件

3.3修改postgresql配置

shared_preload_libraries = 'timescaledb'

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3.4将配置路径输入

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到这一步先暂停不要输入
将timescaleDB解压文件夹中dll文件(有三个)复制到postgresql的lib文件夹下
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3.5复制文件

将sql文件和control文件复制到postgresql的\share\extension文件夹下

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3.6再回到cmd,输入n

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4.查看是否安装成功

打开pgAdmin4

SELECT * FROM pg_available_extensions WHERE name = 'timescaledb';

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5.到此安装完成

This release contains a variety of fixes from 14.0. For information about new features in major release 14, see Section E.2. A dump/restore is not required for those running 14.X. However, note that installations using physical replication should update standby servers before the primary server, as explained in the third changelog entry below. Also, several bugs have been found that may have resulted in corrupted indexes, as explained in the next several changelog entries. If any of those cases apply to you, it's recommended to reindex possibly-affected indexes after updating. Make the server reject extraneous data after an SSL or GSS encryption handshake (Tom Lane) A man-in-the-middle with the ability to inject data into the TCP connection could stuff some cleartext data into the start of a supposedly encryption-protected database session. This could be abused to send faked SQL commands to the server, although that would only work if the server did not demand any authentication data. (However, a server relying on SSL certificate authentication might well not do so.) The PostgreSQL Project thanks Jacob Champion for reporting this problem. (CVE-2021-23214) Make libpq reject extraneous data after an SSL or GSS encryption handshake (Tom Lane) A man-in-the-middle with the ability to inject data into the TCP connection could stuff some cleartext data into the start of a supposedly encryption-protected database session. This could probably be abused to inject faked responses to the client's first few queries, although other details of libpq's behavior make that harder than it sounds. A different line of attack is to exfiltrate the client's password, or other sensitive data that might be sent early in the session. That has been shown to be possible with a server vulnerable to CVE-2021-23214. The PostgreSQL Project thanks Jacob Champion for reporting this problem. (CVE-2021-23222) Fix physical replication for cases where the primary crashes after shipping a WAL se
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