本文揭示了Joux和Wang的多碰撞攻击如何影响包括MD5在内的哈希算法，尤其是MD5由于广泛应用而带来的安全隐患。研究发现，MD5的可附加性允许将任意负载添加到已知的碰撞中。通过Stripwire工具，可以创建两个具有相同MD5哈希但执行不同操作的文件，这影响了文件系统审计工具如Tripwire。同时，该攻击还涉及到HMAC、数字签名和DRM系统，并可能用于对P2P网络的反击式隐写术攻击。尽管风险存在，但实际影响并不像乍看那么严重。
摘要：
Joux and Wang's multicollision attack has yielded collisions for several one-way hash algorithms. Of these, MD5 is the most problematic due to its heavy deployment, but there exists a perception that the flaws identified have no applied implications. We show that the appendability of Merkle-Damgard allows us to add any payload to the proof-of-concept hashes released by Wang et al. We then demonstrate a tool, Stripwire, that uses this capability to create two files - one which executes an arbitrary sequence of commands, the other which hides those commands with the strength of AES - both with the same MD5 hash. We show how this affects file-oriented system auditors such as Tripwire, but point out that the failure is nowhere near as catastrophic as it appears at first glance. We examine how this failure affects HMAC and Digital Signatures within Digital Rights Management (DRM) systems, and how the full attack expands into an unusual pseudo- steganographic strikeback methodology against peer to peer networks.
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