BOA对于cookie的支持不是很好,google了一番,终于在chinaunix上找到了答案,主要还是对网页标头的处理不够全面引起的。补充一点,对于编写出来的cgi-bin文件,用arm-linux-gcc 3.4.1通过,提示是没有网页头,Bad Gateway,缺少LFLF,在目标板上无法运行,而使用3.4.2则OK,arm-gcc的版本问题。具体特性没有深入研究。但boa与cgi-bin的编译器最好是同一个。
修改cgi_header.c,代码如下:
if (!strncasecmp(buf, "Status: ", 8)) {
req->header_line--;
memcpy(req->header_line, "HTTP/1.0 ", 9);
} else if (!strncasecmp(buf, "Location: ", 10)) {
#ifdef FASCIST_LOGGING
log_error_time();
fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d - found Location header /"%s/"/n",
__FILE__, __LINE__, buf + 10);
#endif
if (buf[10] == '/') {
log_error_time();
fprintf(stderr,
"server does not support internal redirection: " /
"/"%s/"/n", buf + 10);
send_r_bad_request(req);
} else {
char *c2;
c2 = strchr(buf + 10, '/n');
--c2;
while (*c2 == '/r')
--c2;
++c2;
*c2++ = '/0';
while ((*c2 == '/n' || *c2 == '/r') && c2 < req->header_end)
++c2;
if (c2 == req->header_end)
send_r_moved_temp(req, buf + 10, "");
else
send_r_moved_temp(req, buf + 10, c2);
}
req->status = DONE;
return 1;
}else {
修改为:
#if 1
while(1) {
int len;
char * pnext = NULL;
char * ptmp = NULL;
/* not find HTTP header tailer */
if (NULL == (pnext=strchr(buf, '/n'))) /* has no '/n' */
break;
/* the length of this line,
* include '/n'
*/
len = pnext - buf + 1;
if (!strncasecmp(buf, "Location: ", 10)) { /* got a location header */
/* not the first one
* exchange this line to the first line
*/
if (buf != req->header_line)
{
if (NULL == (ptmp=(char *)malloc(len)))
{
log_error_time();
perror("malloc");
send_r_error(req);
return 0;
}
/* move Status: to line header */
memcpy(ptmp, buf, len);
memmove(req->header_line+len, req->header_line, buf-req->header_line);
memcpy(req->header_line, ptmp, len);
free(ptmp);
}
/* force pointer header */
buf = req->header_line;
#ifdef FASCIST_LOGGING
log_error_time();
fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d - found Location header /"%s/"/n",
__FILE__, __LINE__, buf + 10);
#endif
if (buf[10] == '/') { /* virtual path */
log_error_time();
fprintf(stderr,
"server does not support internal redirection: " /
"/"%s/"/n", buf + 10);
send_r_bad_request(req);
/*
* We (I, Jon) have declined to support absolute-path parsing
* because I see it as a major security hole.
* Location: /etc/passwd or Location: /etc/shadow is not funny.
*
* Also, the below code is borked.
* request_uri could contain /cgi-bin/bob/extra_path
*/
/*
strcpy(req->request_uri, buf + 10);
return internal_redirect(req);
*/
} else { /* URL */
char *c2;
c2 = strchr(buf + 10, '/n');
/* c2 cannot ever equal NULL here because we already have found one */
--c2;
while (*c2 == '/r')
--c2;
++c2;
/* c2 now points to a '/r' or the '/n' */
*c2++ = '/0'; /* end header */
/* first next header, or is at req->header_end */
while ((*c2 == '/n' || *c2 == '/r') && c2 < req->header_end)
++c2;
if (c2 == req->header_end)
send_r_moved_temp(req, buf + 10, "");
else
send_r_moved_temp(req, buf + 10, c2);
}
req->status = DONE;
return 1;
} else if (!strncasecmp(buf, "Status: ", 8)) {
/* not the first one
* exchange this line to the first line
*/
if (buf != req->header_line)
{
if (NULL == (ptmp=(char *)malloc(len)))
{
log_error_time();
perror("malloc");
send_r_error(req);
return 0;
}
/* move Status: to line header */
memcpy(ptmp, buf, len);
memmove(req->header_line+len, req->header_line, buf-req->header_line);
memcpy(req->header_line, ptmp, len);
free(ptmp);
}
req->header_line--;
memcpy(req->header_line, "HTTP/1.0 ", 9);
return 1;
}
/* pointer to next line */
buf = pnext + 1;
/* reach the end of HTTP header */
if ('/0' == buf[0] || '/n' == buf[0] || '/r' == buf[0])
break;
}
if (1) { /* always done */
#else
if (!strncasecmp(buf, "Status: ", 8)) {
req->header_line--;
memcpy(req->header_line, "HTTP/1.0 ", 9);
} else if (!strncasecmp(buf, "Location: ", 10)) { /* got a location header */
#ifdef FASCIST_LOGGING
log_error_time();
fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d - found Location header /"%s/"/n",
__FILE__, __LINE__, buf + 10);
#endif
if (buf[10] == '/') { /* virtual path */
log_error_time();
fprintf(stderr,
"server does not support internal redirection: " /
"/"%s/"/n", buf + 10);
send_r_bad_request(req);
/*
* We (I, Jon) have declined to support absolute-path parsing
* because I see it as a major security hole.
* Location: /etc/passwd or Location: /etc/shadow is not funny.
*
* Also, the below code is borked.
* request_uri could contain /cgi-bin/bob/extra_path
*/
/*
strcpy(req->request_uri, buf + 10);
return internal_redirect(req);
*/
} else { /* URL */
char *c2;
c2 = strchr(buf + 10, '/n');
/* c2 cannot ever equal NULL here because we already have found one */
--c2;
while (*c2 == '/r')
--c2;
++c2;
/* c2 now points to a '/r' or the '/n' */
*c2++ = '/0'; /* end header */
/* first next header, or is at req->header_end */
while ((*c2 == '/n' || *c2 == '/r') && c2 < req->header_end)
++c2;
if (c2 == req->header_end)
send_r_moved_temp(req, buf + 10, "");
else
send_r_moved_temp(req, buf + 10, c2);
}
req->status = DONE;
return 1;
} else { // replace end not location and not status
#endif