报错内容
- SSL_connect:error in SSLv3/TLS write finished
- 140057291788288:error:1409441B:SSL routines:ssl3_read_bytes:tlsv1 alert decrypt error:ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c:1385:SSL alert number 51
报错原因
- gmssl库生成 certificate verify 消息时，对自客户端Hello消息开始到本消息为止（不包括 certificate verify 消息）的所有握手相关信息内容，使用SM3计算摘要，再使用私钥对该摘要签名，但是签名时没有使用SM2_DEFAULT_ID(1234567812345678)在内部做HASH。
- gmssl实现gmtls协议的步骤中缺少使用SM3计算摘要信息，再使用私钥对摘要进行签名
- 前面你们客户端能连上gmssl服务端，应该是解决了第一个问题。虽然第二个问题没解决，也能连成功，是因为gmssl客户端和服务端计算过程是一样，才没报错，但是这样的计算过程不符合规范的，跟其他对接就会出问题了。
相关内容
- 版本：GmSSL 2.5.4 - OpenSSL 1.1.0d 19 Jun 2019
- 工作路径：/home/chy-cpabe/tmp/first /home/chy-cpabe/tmp/second
- 每个路径下包含 签名私钥 签名证书 加密私钥 加密证书 根证书 五个文件
- 根秘钥和身份认证网关保持一致
- first 、second、身份认证网关三个地方的证书文件均有同一个PKI进行签发
修改文件
- 目前仅仅修改了 statem_clnt 和 statem_srvr 两个文件，后期手写自己的客户端和服务端代码进行函数调用的时候，还需要修改底层函数的实现细节
statem_clnt
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2014 - 2017 The GmSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the GmSSL Project.
* (http://gmssl.org/)"
*
* 4. The name "GmSSL Project" must not be used to endorse or promote
* products derived from this software without prior written
* permission. For written permission, please contact
* guanzhi1980@gmail.com.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "GmSSL"
* nor may "GmSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the GmSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the GmSSL Project
* (http://gmssl.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE GmSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE GmSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*/
/*
* Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
*
* Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
*
* The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
* license provided above.
*
* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
* Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
*
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
* The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
* license.
*
* The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
*
* No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
*
* No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
* to make use of the Contribution.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
* OTHERWISE.
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include "../ssl_locl.h"
#include "statem_locl.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
# include <openssl/md5.h>
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
# include <openssl/dh.h>
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
# include <openssl/sm2.h>
#endif
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
# include <openssl/engine.h>
#endif
static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
unsigned char *p);
/*
* Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
*
* Return values are:
* 1: Yes
* 0: No
*/
static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
{
/* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
&& (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
|| (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
return 0;
return 1;
}
/*
* Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
*
* Return values are:
* 1: Yes
* 0: No
*/
static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
{
long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GMTLS
if (SSL_IS_GMTLS(s))
return 1;
#endif
/*
* Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
* ciphersuite or for SRP
*/
if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK |
SSL_kSM2DHE | SSL_kSM2PSK | SSL_kSRP)) {
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
* handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
* server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
* current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
*
* Return values are:
* 1: Success (transition allowed)
* 0: Error (transition not allowed)
*/
int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
int ske_expected;
switch (st->hand_state) {
case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
return 1;
}
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
return 1;
}
}
break;
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
if (s->hit) {
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
return 1;
}
} else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
return 1;
}
} else {
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
return 1;
} else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
&& s->tls_session_secret_cb != NULL
&& s->session->tlsext_tick != NULL
&& mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
/*
* Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
* from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
* the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
* the server is resuming.
*/
s->hit = 1;
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
return 1;
} else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
return 1;
}
} else {
ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
/* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
if (ske_expected
|| ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
&& mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
return 1;
}
} else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
&& cert_req_allowed(s)) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
return 1;
} else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
return 1;
}
}
}
break;
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
/*
* The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
* |tlsext_status_expected| is set
*/
if (s->tlsext_status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
return 1;
}
/* Fall through */
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
/* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
&& mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
return 1;
}
goto err;
}
/* Fall through */
case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
return 1;
}
goto err;
}
/* Fall through */
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
return 1;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
return 1;
}
} else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
return 1;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
return 1;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
return 1;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
err:
/* No valid transition found */
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
return 0;
}
/*
* client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
* when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
*/
WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch (st->hand_state) {
case TLS_ST_OK:
/* Renegotiation - fall through */
case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
/*
* No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
* we will be sent
*/
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
else
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
/*
* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
* sent, but no verify packet is sent
*/
/*
* XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
* cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
* need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
* ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
*/
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
} else {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
}
if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
}
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
#else
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
else
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
#endif
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
#endif
case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
if (s->hit) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
} else {
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
}
case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
if (s->hit) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
} else {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
}
}
/*
* Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
* the client to the server.
*/
WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch (st->hand_state) {
case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
s->shutdown = 0;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
}
break;
case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
if (s->hit) {
/*
* We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
* messages unless we need to.
*/
st->use_timer = 0;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
#endif
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_OK:
return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
default:
/* No pre work to be done */
break;
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
/*
* Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
* client to the server.
*/
WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
s->init_num = 0;
switch (st->hand_state) {
case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1)
return WORK_MORE_A;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* Treat the next message as the first packet */
s->first_packet = 1;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
return WORK_ERROR;
break;
case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
s->session->compress_meth = 0;
#else
if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
s->session->compress_meth = 0;
else
s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
#endif
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
return WORK_ERROR;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
return WORK_ERROR;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (s->hit) {
/*
* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
* no SCTP used.
*/
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
0, NULL);
}
#endif
dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
}
break;
case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
/*
* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
* no SCTP used.
*/
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
0, NULL);
}
#endif
if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
return WORK_MORE_B;
break;
default:
/* No post work to be done */
break;
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
/*
* Construct a message to be sent from the client to the server.
*
* Valid return values are:
* 1: Success
* 0: Error
*/
int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch (st->hand_state) {
case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
return tls_construct_client_hello(s);
case TLS_ST_CW_CERT:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GMTLS
if (SSL_IS_GMTLS(s))
return gmtls_construct_client_certificate(s);
else
#endif
return tls_construct_client_certificate(s);
case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GMTLS
if (SSL_IS_GMTLS(s))
return gmtls_construct_client_key_exchange(s);
else
#endif
return tls_construct_client_key_exchange(s);
case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
return tls_construct_client_verify(s);
case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
else
return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
return tls_construct_next_proto(s);
#endif
case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
return tls_construct_finished(s,
s->method->
ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
s->method->
ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
break;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
* reading. Excludes the message header.
*/
unsigned long ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch (st->hand_state) {
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
return s->max_cert_list;
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
/*
* Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
* practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
* to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
*/
return s->max_cert_list;
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
return 3;
return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
break;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
*/
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch (st->hand_state) {
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GMTLS
if (SSL_IS_GMTLS(s))
return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
#endif
return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GMTLS
if (SSL_IS_GMTLS(s))
return gmtls_process_server_key_exchange(s, pkt);
#endif
return tls_process_server_key_exchange(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
break;
}
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
/*
* Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
* from the server
*/
WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch (st->hand_state) {
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
/* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
return WORK_MORE_A;
}
ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
#endif
default:
break;
}
/* Shouldn't happen */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned char *p, *d;
int i;
int protverr;
unsigned long l;
int al = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
int j;
SSL_COMP *comp;
#endif
SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
/* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
if (protverr != 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
goto err;
}
if ((sess == NULL) || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) ||
/*
* In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
* "ticket" without a session ID.
*/
(!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
(sess->not_resumable)) {
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
goto err;
}
/* else use the pre-loaded session */
p = s->s3->client_random;
/*
* for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
* required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
*/
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
size_t idx;
i = 1;
for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
if (p[idx]) {
i = 0;
break;
}
}
} else
i = 1;
if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
goto err;
/* Do the message type and length last */
d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
/*-
* version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
* an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
* field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
* used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
* choke if we initially report a higher version then
* renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
* didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
* but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
* 1.0.
*
* Possible scenario with previous logic:
* 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
* 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
* 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
* 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
* 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
* 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
* know that is maximum server supports.
* 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
* containing version 1.0.
*
* For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
* maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
* on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
* being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
* TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
* client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
* the negotiated version.
*/
*(p++) = s->client_version >> 8;
*(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff;
/* Random stuff */
memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
/* Session ID */
if (s->new_session)
i = 0;
else
i = s->session->session_id_length;
*(p++) = i;
if (i != 0) {
if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i);
p += i;
}
/* cookie stuff for DTLS */
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
*(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len;
memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
p += s->d1->cookie_len;
}
/* Ciphers supported */
i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2]));
if (i == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
goto err;
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
/*
* Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
* chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
* use TLS v1.2
*/
if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
&& i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
#endif
s2n(i, p);
p += i;
/* COMPRESSION */
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
*(p++) = 1;
#else
if (!ssl_allow_compression(s) || !s->ctx->comp_methods)
j = 0;
else
j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
*(p++) = 1 + j;
for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
*(p++) = comp->id;
}
#endif
*(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
/* TLS extensions */
if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
if ((s->version != GMTLS_VERSION) && (p =
ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
&al)) == NULL) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
l = p - d;
if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
return 1;
err:
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
int al;
unsigned int cookie_len;
PACKET cookiepkt;
if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
PACKET session_id;
size_t session_id_len;
const unsigned char *cipherchars;
int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
unsigned int compression;
unsigned int sversion;
int protverr;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
SSL_COMP *comp;
#endif
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
if (protverr != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr);
goto f_err;
}
/* load the server hello data */
/* load the server random */
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
s->hit = 0;
/* Get the session-id. */
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id
|| session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
/*
* Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
* EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
* Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
* Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
* works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
* layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
* servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
* is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
* we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
* server wants to resume.
*/
if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb &&
s->session->tlsext_tick) {
const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
&s->session->master_key_length,
NULL, &pref_cipher,
s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
} else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
}
if (session_id_len != 0 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
&& memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
session_id_len) == 0) {
if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
|| memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
/* actually a client application bug */
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
goto f_err;
}
s->hit = 1;
} else {
/*
* If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
* didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
* In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
* so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
* overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
*/
if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
goto f_err;
}
}
s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
/* session_id_len could be 0 */
if (session_id_len > 0)
memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
session_id_len);
}
/* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
if (c == NULL) {
/* unknown cipher */
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
* version.
*/
s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
/*
* If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
* or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
*/
if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
if (i < 0) {
/* we did not say we would use this cipher */
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
* and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
* set and use it for comparison.
*/
if (s->session->cipher)
s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
/* lets get the compression algorithm */
/* COMPRESSION */
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
if (compression != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
* using compression.
*/
if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
goto f_err;
}
#else
if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
if (compression == 0)
comp = NULL;
else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
goto f_err;
} else {
comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
}
if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
goto f_err;
} else {
s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
}
#endif
/* TLS extensions */
if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
/* wrong packet length */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
/*
* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
* no SCTP used.
*/
memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
sizeof(sctpauthkey),
labelbuffer,
sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
goto err;
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
}
#endif
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;
unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
X509 *x = NULL;
const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
|| !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
certstart = certbytes;
x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
if (x == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto f_err;
}
if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
x = NULL;
}
i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
/*
* The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
* for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
* However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
* to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
* no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
* reverted because at least one application *only* set
* SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
* server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
* nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
* sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
* (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
* set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
*/
if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
goto f_err;
}
ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
if (i > 1) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
goto f_err;
}
s->session->peer_chain = sk;
/*
* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
* which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
*/
x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
sk = NULL;
/*
* VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
*/
pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
x = NULL;
al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
if (i < 0) {
x = NULL;
al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
&& (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
(i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
&& i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
x = NULL;
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
s->session->peer_type = i;
X509_free(s->session->peer);
X509_up_ref(x);
s->session->peer = x;
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
x = NULL;
ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
goto done;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
done:
X509_free(x);
sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
return ret;
}
static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
PACKET psk_identity_hint;
/* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
/*
* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
* tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
* a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
* identity.
*/
if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
return 0;
}
if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
} else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
&s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
return 1;
#else
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
#endif
}
static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
if ((s->srp_ctx.N =
BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
|| (s->srp_ctx.g =
BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
|| (s->srp_ctx.s =
BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
|| (s->srp_ctx.B =
BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
return 0;
}
if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, al)) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
return 0;
}
/* We must check if there is a certificate */
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
*pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
return 1;
#else
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
#endif
}
static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
DH *dh = NULL;
BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
int check_bits = 0;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
dh = DH_new();
if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL);
bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key), PACKET_remaining(&pub_key),
NULL);
if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* test non-zero pupkey */
if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
goto err;
}
if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p = g = NULL;
if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
goto err;
}
if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
bnpub_key = NULL;
if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
goto err;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
/*
* FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
* public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
*/
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
*pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
/* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
return 1;
err:
BN_free(p);
BN_free(g);
BN_free(bnpub_key);
DH_free(dh);
EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
return 0;
#else
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
#endif
}
static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
PACKET encoded_pt;
const unsigned char *ecparams;
int curve_nid;
unsigned int curve_flags;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
/*
* Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
* public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
* ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
*/
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
return 0;
}
/*
* Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
* invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
*/
if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
return 0;
}
curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2), &curve_flags);
if (curve_nid == 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
return 0;
}
if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, curve_nid)) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
EVP_PKEY_free(key);
return 0;
}
s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
} else {
/* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
if (pctx == NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
return 0;
}
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
pctx = NULL;
}
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
/* parse remote ephem point */
if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
return 0;
}
/*
* The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
* ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
* and ECDSA.
*/
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
*pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSM2)
*pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
#endif
else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
*pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
/* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
return 1;
#else
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
#endif
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
int al = -1;
long alg_k;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
PACKET save_param_start, signature;
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
save_param_start = *pkt;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
#endif
if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
goto err;
}
/* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
} else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
goto err;
} else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
goto err;
} else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK | SSL_kSM2DHE | SSL_kSM2PSK)) {
if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
goto err;
} else if (alg_k) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto err;
}
/* if it was signed, check the signature */
if (pkey != NULL) {
PACKET params;
int maxsig;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx;
/*
* |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
* equals the length of the parameters.
*/
if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
const unsigned char *sigalgs;
int rv;
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sigalgs, 2)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto err;
}
rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sigalgs, pkey);
if (rv == -1) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto err;
} else if (rv == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto err;
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
} else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MD5) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA)
md = EVP_md5_sha1();
# elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SM3)
md = EVP_sm3();
# else
should_not_happen!!
# endif
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GMTLS
} else if (s->method->version == GMTLS_VERSION
&& s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac & SSL_SM3) {
md = EVP_sm3();
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
} else {
md = EVP_sha1();
#endif
}
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
if (maxsig < 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/*
* Check signature length
*/
if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
/* wrong packet length */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
goto err;
}
md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (md_ctx == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0) {
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSM2) {
unsigned char z[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
size_t zlen = sizeof(z);
char *id = SM2_DEFAULT_ID;
if (!SM2_compute_id_digest(md, id, strlen(id), z, &zlen,
EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey))) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_SM2_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, z, zlen) <= 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
#endif
if (EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
|| EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
|| EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) {
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
PACKET_remaining(&signature), pkey) <= 0) {
/* bad signature */
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto err;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
} else {
/* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
&& !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
/* Might be wrong key type, check it */
if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
/* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
} else {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
}
goto err;
}
/* still data left over */
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
goto err;
}
}
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
err:
if (al != -1)
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
unsigned int list_len, ctype_num, i, name_len;
X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
const unsigned char *data;
const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* get the certificate types */
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ctype_num)
|| !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ctype_num)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes);
s->cert->ctypes = NULL;
if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) {
/* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num);
if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, data, ctype_num);
s->cert->ctype_num = (size_t)ctype_num;
ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
}
for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = data[i];
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
|| !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, list_len)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
/* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
}
if ((list_len & 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, list_len)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
} else {
ssl_set_default_md(s);
}
/* get the CA RDNs */
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != list_len) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &name_len)
|| !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &namebytes, name_len)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
namestart = namebytes;
if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes,
name_len)) == NULL) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
xn = NULL;
}
/* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
ca_sk = NULL;
ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
goto done;
err:
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
done:
X509_NAME_free(xn);
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
return ret;
}
static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
{
return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
int al;
unsigned int ticklen;
unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint;
if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
/* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */
if (ticklen == 0)
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
/*
* We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
* one
*/
if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
/*
* Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
*/
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
}
if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
s->session = new_sess;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
/*
* There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
* an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
* ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
* and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
* other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
* presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
* We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
* elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
* SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
*/
if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen,
s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_sha256), NULL)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
int al;
unsigned long resplen;
unsigned int type;
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
|| type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &resplen)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, resplen)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
/* should contain no data */
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
}
#endif
/*
* at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
* the server
*/
if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
/*
* Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |tlsext_ocsp_resp| and
* |tlsext_ocsp_resplen| values will be set if we actually received a status
* message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
*/
if (s->tlsext_status_type != -1 && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb != NULL) {
int ret;
ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
if (ret == 0) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
if (ret < 0) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
/* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Only applies to renegotiation */
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
&& s->renegotiate != 0)
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
else
#endif
return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
}
static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
size_t *pskhdrlen, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
int ret = 0;
/*
* The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
* \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
* strnlen.
*/
char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
size_t identitylen = 0;
unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
char *tmpidentity = NULL;
size_t psklen = 0;
if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto err;
}
memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
psk, sizeof(psk));
if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
goto err;
} else if (psklen == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
goto err;
}
identitylen = strlen(identity);
if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
goto err;
}
tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto err;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
tmppsk = NULL;
OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
tmpidentity = NULL;
s2n(identitylen, *p);
memcpy(*p, identity, identitylen);
*pskhdrlen = 2 + identitylen;
*p += identitylen;
ret = 1;
err:
OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
return ret;
#else
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
#endif
}
static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned char *q;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
size_t enclen;
unsigned char *pms = NULL;
size_t pmslen = 0;
if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
/*
* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
*/
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
if (pms == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, pmslen - 2) <= 0) {
goto err;
}
q = *p;
/* Fix buf for TLS, GMTLS and beyond */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION || SSL_IS_GMTLS(s))
*p += 2;
pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, *p, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
goto err;
}
*len = enclen;
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
pctx = NULL;
# ifdef PKCS1_CHECK
if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
(*p)[1]++;
if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
tmp_buf[0] = 0x70;
# endif
/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION || SSL_IS_GMTLS(s)) {
s2n(*len, q);
*len += 2;
}
s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
return 1;
err:
OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
return 0;
#else
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
#endif
}
static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *dh_clnt = NULL;
const BIGNUM *pub_key;
EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
if (skey == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
if (ckey == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey) == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
return 0;
}
/* send off the data */
DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
*len = BN_num_bytes(pub_key);
s2n(*len, *p);
BN_bn2bin(pub_key, *p);
*len += 2;
EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
return 1;
#else
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
#endif
}
static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
int encoded_pt_len = 0;
EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
if (skey == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
if (ckey == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey) == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* Generate encoding of client key */
encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
ckey = NULL;
*len = encoded_pt_len;
/* length of encoded point */
**p = *len;
*p += 1;
/* copy the point */
memcpy(*p, encodedPoint, *len);
/* increment len to account for length field */
*len += 1;
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
return 1;
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
return 0;
#else
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
#endif
}
static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
/* GOST key exchange message creation */
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
X509 *peer_cert;
size_t msglen;
unsigned int md_len;
unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
unsigned char *pms = NULL;
size_t pmslen = 0;
if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
/*
* Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
*/
peer_cert = s->session->peer;
if (!peer_cert) {
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
return 0;
}
pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
/*
* If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
* parameters match those of server certificate, use
* certificate key for key exchange
*/
/* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
pmslen = 32;
pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
if (pms == NULL) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
/* Generate session key */
|| RAND_bytes(pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
};
/*
* Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
* data
*/
ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (ukm_hash == NULL
|| EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
ukm_hash = NULL;
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
goto err;
}
/* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
/*
* Encapsulate it into sequence
*/
*((*p)++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
msglen = 255;
if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
goto err;
}
if (msglen >= 0x80) {
*((*p)++) = 0x81;
*((*p)++) = msglen & 0xff;
*len = msglen + 3;
} else {
*((*p)++) = msglen & 0xff;
*len = msglen + 2;
}
memcpy(*p, tmp, msglen);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
return 1;
err:
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
return 0;
#else
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
#endif
}
static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) {
/* send off the data */
*len = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A);
s2n(*len, *p);
BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, *p);
*len += 2;
} else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
return 1;
#else
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
#endif
}
int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
int len;
size_t pskhdrlen = 0;
unsigned long alg_k;
int al = -1;
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
&& !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, &p, &pskhdrlen, &al))
goto err;
if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
len = 0;
} else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, &p, &len, &al))
goto err;
} else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, &p, &len, &al))
goto err;
} else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK | SSL_kSM2DHE |
SSL_kSM2PSK)) {
if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, &p, &len, &al))
goto err;
} else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, &p, &len, &al))
goto err;
} else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, &p, &len, &al))
goto err;
} else {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
len += pskhdrlen;
if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, len)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
return 1;
err:
if (al != -1)
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
#endif
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *pms = NULL;
size_t pmslen = 0;
pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
/* Check for SRP */
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
return 1;
}
#endif
if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
/* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
pms = NULL;
pmslen = 0;
goto err;
}
pms = NULL;
pmslen = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
/*
* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
* used.
*/
memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
goto err;
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
}
#endif
return 1;
err:
OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
return 0;
}
int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
const EVP_MD *md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys];
EVP_MD_CTX *mctx;
unsigned u = 0;
unsigned long n = 0;
long hdatalen = 0;
void *hdata;
int ret;
unsigned char out[81920];
mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (mctx == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
// modify begin 使用gmtls 生成 certificate verify 消息，应该使用签名证书私钥
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GMTLS
if (SSL_IS_GMTLS(s) && s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_SM2].privatekey)
pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_SM2].privatekey;
else
#endif
pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
// modify end
hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
if (hdatalen <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
memcpy(out, (unsigned char *)hdata, hdatalen);
out[hdatalen] = 0;
ret = hdatalen;
// modify begin 使用gmtls 对从 client hello 消息到 client CertificateVerify 消息（不包括client CertificateVerify消息）所有内容做SM3摘要计算
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
EVP_MD_CTX *mctx1 = NULL;
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSM2)
{
// from client hello to client CertificateVerify(not include CertificateVerify) make sm3
mctx1 = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (mctx1 == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_init(mctx1);
if (!EVP_DigestInit(mctx1, md)
|| EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx1, (unsigned char *)hdata,
hdatalen) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx1, out, &ret) <= 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
out[ret] = 0;
}
if (mctx1 != NULL)
EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx1);
#endif
// modify end
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
p += 2;
n = 2;
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
// modify begin 使用gmtls 从上面得到的SM3摘要结果，还需要使用 SM2_DEFAULT_ID（1234567812345678） 做内部哈希，再签名
if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSM2)
{
// SM2_DEFAULT_ID to assign, when compute CertificateVerify sign
unsigned char z[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
size_t zlen;
char *id = NULL;
id = SM2_DEFAULT_ID;
zlen = sizeof(z);
if (!SM2_compute_id_digest(EVP_sm3(), id, strlen(id), z, &zlen,
EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_SM2_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_SignUpdate(mctx, z, zlen))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
#endif
//if (!EVP_SignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) || (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,s->session->master_key_length,s->session->master_key)) || !EVP_SignFinal(mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey))
if (!EVP_SignUpdate(mctx, out, ret) || (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,s->session->master_key_length,s->session->master_key)) || !EVP_SignFinal(mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
// modify end
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
{
int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
|| pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
|| pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)
BUF_reverse(p + 2, NULL, u);
}
#endif
s2n(u, p);
n += u + 2;
/* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
goto err;
if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
return 1;
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
return 0;
}
/*
* Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
* cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
* certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
*/
static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
{
if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey)
return 0;
/* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys])
return 0;
/*
* If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
* adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
*/
if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
!tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
return 0;
return 1;
}
WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
X509 *x509 = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
int i;
if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
/* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
if (i < 0) {
s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
return WORK_MORE_A;
}
if (i == 0) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
}
if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
/* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
wst = WORK_MORE_B;
}
/* We need to get a client cert */
if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
/*
* If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
* return(-1); We then get retied later
*/
i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
if (i < 0) {
s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
return WORK_MORE_B;
}
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
i = 0;
} else if (i == 1) {
i = 0;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
}
X509_free(x509);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
i = 0;
if (i == 0) {
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
} else {
s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
}
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
/* Shouldn't ever get here */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s)
{
if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
(s->s3->tmp.cert_req ==
2) ? NULL : s->cert->key)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
#define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
{
int i;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
int idx;
#endif
long alg_k, alg_a;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
/* we don't have a certificate */
if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
return (1);
/* This is the passed certificate */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
idx = s->session->peer_type;
if ((idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) || (idx == SSL_PKEY_SM2)) { /* GMTLS */
if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
/* check failed */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
goto f_err;
} else {
return 1;
}
} else if ((alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) || (alg_a & SSL_aSM2)) { /* GMTLS */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
#endif
pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);
/* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) &&
!has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
goto f_err;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
#endif
return (1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
return (0);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s)
{
unsigned int len, padding_len;
unsigned char *d;
len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
d[4] = len;
memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
d[5 + len] = padding_len;
memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len);
*(d++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d);
s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len;
s->init_off = 0;
return 1;
}
#endif
int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
{
int i = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (i != 0)
return i;
}
#endif
if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
return i;
}
int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, unsigned char *p)
{
int i, j = 0;
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
unsigned char *q;
int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
/* Set disabled masks for this session */
ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
if (sk == NULL)
return (0);
q = p;
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
/* Skip disabled ciphers */
if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED))
continue;
j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, p);
p += j;
}
/*
* If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add
* applicable SCSVs.
*/
if (p != q) {
if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
};
j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, p);
p += j;
}
if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
};
j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, p);
p += j;
}
}
return (p - q);
}
statem_srvr
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2014 - 2017 The GmSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the GmSSL Project.
* (http://gmssl.org/)"
*
* 4. The name "GmSSL Project" must not be used to endorse or promote
* products derived from this software without prior written
* permission. For written permission, please contact
* guanzhi1980@gmail.com.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "GmSSL"
* nor may "GmSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the GmSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the GmSSL Project
* (http://gmssl.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE GmSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE GmSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*/
/*
* Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
*
* Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
*
* The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
* license provided above.
*
* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
* Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
*
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
* The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
* license.
*
* The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
*
* No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
*
* No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
* to make use of the Contribution.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
* OTHERWISE.
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include "../ssl_locl.h"
#include "statem_locl.h"
#include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
# include <openssl/sm2.h>
#endif
static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
PACKET *cipher_suites,
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
**skp, int sslv2format,
int *al);
/*
* server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed handshake
* state transitions when the server is reading messages from the client. The
* message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The current state
* is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
*
* Valid return values are:
* 1: Success (transition allowed)
* 0: Error (transition not allowed)
*/
int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch (st->hand_state) {
case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
return 1;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
/*
* If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
* 1) We didn't request a Certificate
* OR
* 2) If we did request one then
* a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
* AND
* b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
* list if we requested a certificate)
*/
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
&& (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
/*
* This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
* not going to accept it because we require a client
* cert.
*/
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
return 0;
}
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
return 1;
}
} else {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
return 1;
}
} else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
return 1;
}
}
break;
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
return 1;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
/*
* We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
* received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
* will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
* not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
* the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
* set.
*/
if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
/*
* For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
* pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
* not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
* its key from the certificate for key exchange.
*/
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
return 1;
}
} else {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
return 1;
}
}
break;
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
return 1;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
return 1;
}
} else {
#endif
if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
return 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
}
#endif
break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
return 1;
}
break;
#endif
case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
return 1;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
/* No valid transition found */
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
return 0;
}
/*
* Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
*
* Valid return values are:
* 1: Yes
* 0: No
*/
static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GMTLS
if (SSL_IS_GMTLS(s))
return 1;
#endif
/*
* only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
* sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
* ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
* the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
* the server certificate contains the server's public key for
* key exchange.
*/
if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kSM2DHE)
/*
* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
* provided
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
/* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
|| ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
&& s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
/* For other PSK always send SKE */
|| (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK | SSL_kSM2PSK)))
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
/* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
|| (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
#endif
) {
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
*
* Valid return values are:
* 1: Yes
* 0: No
*/
static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
{
if (
/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
/*
* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
* during re-negotiation:
*/
&& (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 ||
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
/*
* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
* section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
* RFC 2246):
*/
&& (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
/*
* ... except when the application insists on
* verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
* this for SSL 3)
*/
|| (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
/* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
/*
* With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
* are omitted
*/
&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
* when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
*/
WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch (st->hand_state) {
case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
/* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
case TLS_ST_OK:
/* We must be trying to renegotiate */
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
&& (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
else
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
if (s->hit) {
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
else
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
} else {
/* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
/* normal PSK or SRP */
if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
(SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
} else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
} else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
} else {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
}
}
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
/* Fall through */
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
/* Fall through */
case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
}
/* Fall through */
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
if (s->hit) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
} else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
} else {
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
}
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
if (s->hit) {
return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
}
st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
}
}
/*
* Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
* the server to the client.
*/
WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch (st->hand_state) {
case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
s->shutdown = 0;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
break;
case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
s->shutdown = 0;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
/* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
st->use_timer = 0;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/*
* Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
* retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
*/
st->use_timer = 1;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
#endif
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/*
* We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
* unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
*/
st->use_timer = 0;
}
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/*
* We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
* unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
* already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
* but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
*/
st->use_timer = 0;
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
case TLS_ST_OK:
return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
default:
/* No pre work to be done */
break;
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
/*
* Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
* server to the client.
*/
WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
s->init_num = 0;
switch (st->hand_state) {
case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
return WORK_MORE_A;
if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
break;
case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
return WORK_MORE_A;
/* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
/*
* The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
* treat like it was the first packet
*/
s->first_packet = 1;
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
/*
* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
* SCTP used.
*/
memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
0) <= 0) {
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
}
#endif
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
/*
* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
* no SCTP used.
*/
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
0, NULL);
}
#endif
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
{
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
return WORK_MORE_A;
break;
case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
return WORK_MORE_A;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
/*
* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
* no SCTP used.
*/
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
0, NULL);
}
#endif
break;
default:
/* No post work to be done */
break;
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
/*
* Construct a message to be sent from the server to the client.
*
* Valid return values are:
* 1: Success
* 0: Error
*/
int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch (st->hand_state) {
case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
return dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(s);
case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
return tls_construct_hello_request(s);
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
return tls_construct_server_hello(s);
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GMTLS
if (SSL_IS_GMTLS(s))
return gmtls_construct_server_certificate(s);
#endif
return tls_construct_server_certificate(s);
case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GMTLS
if (SSL_IS_GMTLS(s))
return gmtls_construct_server_key_exchange(s);
#endif
return tls_construct_server_key_exchange(s);
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
return tls_construct_certificate_request(s);
case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
return tls_construct_server_done(s);
case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
return tls_construct_new_session_ticket(s);
case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
return tls_construct_cert_status(s);
case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
else
return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
return tls_construct_finished(s,
s->method->
ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
s->method->
ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
break;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
* calculated as follows:
*
* 2 + # client_version
* 32 + # only valid length for random
* 1 + # length of session_id
* 32 + # maximum size for session_id
* 2 + # length of cipher suites
* 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
* 1 + # length of compression_methods
* 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
* 2 + # length of extensions
* 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
*/
#define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
#define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
#define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
/*
* Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
* reading. Excludes the message header.
*/
unsigned long ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch (st->hand_state) {
case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
return s->max_cert_list;
case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
#endif
case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
break;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Process a message that the server has received from the client.
*/
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch (st->hand_state) {
case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GMTLS
if (SSL_IS_GMTLS(s))
return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
#endif
return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GMTLS
if (SSL_IS_GMTLS(s))
return gmtls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
#endif
return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
#endif
case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
break;
}
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
/*
* Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
* from the client
*/
WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch (st->hand_state) {
case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
/* Are we renegotiating? */
&& s->renegotiate && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
return WORK_MORE_A;
} else {
ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
}
#endif
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
default:
break;
}
/* Shouldn't happen */
return WORK_ERROR;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
{
int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
*al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
(s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
/*
* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
* login name
*/
ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
*al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
} else {
ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
}
}
return ret;
}
#endif
int tls_construct_hello_request(SSL *s)
{
if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
unsigned int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(unsigned char *buf,
unsigned char *cookie,
unsigned char cookie_len)
{
unsigned int msg_len;
unsigned char *p;
p = buf;
/* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
*(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8;
*(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xFF;
*(p++) = (unsigned char)cookie_len;
memcpy(p, cookie, cookie_len);
p += cookie_len;
msg_len = p - buf;
return msg_len;
}
int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s)
{
unsigned int len;
unsigned char *buf;
buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
&(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0 ||
s->d1->cookie_len > 255) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
len = dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(&buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH],
s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
dtls1_set_message_header(s, DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, len, 0, len);
len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
/* number of bytes to write */
s->init_num = len;
s->init_off = 0;
return 1;
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
unsigned int j, complen = 0;
unsigned long id;
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
#endif
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
int protverr;
/* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
PACKET session_id, cipher_suites, compression, extensions, cookie;
int is_v2_record;
static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
is_v2_record = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
/* First lets get s->client_version set correctly */
if (is_v2_record) {
unsigned int version;
unsigned int mt;
/*-
* An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
* header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
* record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
* the rest right through. Its format is:
* Byte Content
* 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
* 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
* 3-4 version
* 5-6 cipher_spec_length
* 7-8 session_id_length
* 9-10 challenge_length
* ... ...
*/
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
|| mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
/*
* Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
* layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
* in the first place
*/
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &version)) {
/* No protocol version supplied! */
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
goto err;
}
if (version == 0x0002) {
/* This is real SSLv2. We don't support it. */
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
goto err;
} else if ((version & 0xff00) == (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
/* SSLv3/TLS */
s->client_version = version;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GMTLS
} else if (version == GMTLS_VERSION) {
s->client_version = version;
#endif
} else {
/* No idea what protocol this is */
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
goto err;
}
} else {
/*
* use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
* differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
*/
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->client_version)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
}
/*
* Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
* versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
*/
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s);
} else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->client_version, s->version)) {
protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
} else {
protverr = 0;
}
if (protverr) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) {
/*
* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
* number
*/
s->version = s->client_version;
}
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
/* Parse the message and load client random. */
if (is_v2_record) {
/*
* Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
* Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
* Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected above.
*/
unsigned int cipher_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
PACKET challenge;
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &cipher_len)
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &cipher_suites, cipher_len)
|| !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &session_id, session_id_len)
|| !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
/* No extensions. */
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
/* Load the client random and compression list. */
challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE :
challenge_len;
memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
s->s3->client_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
challenge_len, challenge_len)
/* Advertise only null compression. */
|| !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
PACKET_null_init(&extensions);
} else {
/* Regular ClientHello. */
if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if (PACKET_remaining(&session_id) > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
* just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
* So check cookie length...
*/
if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
if (PACKET_remaining(&cookie) == 0)
return 1;
}
}
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cipher_suites)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
/* Could be empty. */
extensions = *pkt;
}
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookie),
PACKET_remaining(&cookie)) ==
0) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
/* else cookie verification succeeded */
}
/* default verification */
} else if (!PACKET_equal(&cookie, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len)) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
}
if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s);
if (protverr != 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
s->version = s->client_version;
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
}
}
s->hit = 0;
/*
* We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
* TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
*
* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
* renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
* ignore resumption requests with flag
* SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
* than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
* this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
* 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
* request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
* unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
* SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
* ignored.
*/
if (is_v2_record ||
(s->new_session &&
(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
goto err;
} else {
i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &extensions, &session_id);
/*
* Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
* version.
* RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
* with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
* the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
* In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
* will abort the handshake with an error.
*/
if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
/* previous session */
s->hit = 1;
} else if (i == -1) {
goto err;
} else {
/* i == 0 */
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
goto err;
}
}
if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &cipher_suites, &(ciphers),
is_v2_record, &al) == NULL) {
goto f_err;
}
/* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
if (s->hit) {
j = 0;
id = s->session->cipher->id;
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
#endif
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
#endif
if (c->id == id) {
j = 1;
break;
}
}
if (j == 0) {
/*
* we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
* to reuse it
*/
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
goto f_err;
}
}
complen = PACKET_remaining(&compression);
for (j = 0; j < complen; j++) {
if (PACKET_data(&compression)[j] == 0)
break;
}
if (j >= complen) {
/* no compress */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
goto f_err;
}
/* TLS extensions */
if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &extensions)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
}
/*
* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
* for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
* calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
* processing to use it in key derivation.
*/
{
unsigned char *pos;
pos = s->s3->server_random;
if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
goto f_err;
}
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GMTLS
if (!s->hit && (s->version == GMTLS_VERSION || s->version >= TLS1_VERSION)
&& s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
#else
if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
#endif
const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
&s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
&pref_cipher,
s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
s->hit = 1;
s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
ciphers = NULL;
/* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
pref_cipher =
pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
s->
session->ciphers,
SSL_get_ciphers
(s));
if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
}
}
/*
* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
* options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
* algorithms from the client, starting at q.
*/
s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
/* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
unsigned int k;
/* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
/* Can't disable compression */
if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
goto f_err;
}
/* Look for resumed compression method */
for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
if (comp_id == comp->id) {
s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
break;
}
}
if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
goto f_err;
}
/* Look for resumed method in compression list */
for (k = 0; k < complen; k++) {
if (PACKET_data(&compression)[k] == comp_id)
break;
}
if (k >= complen) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
goto f_err;
}
} else if (s->hit)
comp = NULL;
else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
/* See if we have a match */
int m, nn, v, done = 0;
unsigned int o;
nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
v = comp->id;
for (o = 0; o < complen; o++) {
if (v == PACKET_data(&compression)[o]) {
done = 1;
break;
}
}
if (done)
break;
}
if (done)
s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
else
comp = NULL;
}
#else
/*
* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
* using compression.
*/
if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
goto f_err;
}
#endif
/*
* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
*/
if (!s->hit) {
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
s->session->compress_meth = 0;
#else
s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
#endif
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
if (ciphers == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
ciphers = NULL;
if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
}
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
if (!s->hit) {
/* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
if (rv == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
if (rv < 0) {
s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
return WORK_MORE_A;
}
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
}
cipher =
ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
if (cipher == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
/* check whether we should disable session resumption */
if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
((cipher->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kSM2DHE)) != 0));
if (s->session->not_resumable)
/* do not send a session ticket */
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
} else {
/* Session-id reuse */
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
}
if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
}
/*-
* we now have the following setup.
* client_random
* cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
* ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
* compression - basically ignored right now
* ssl version is set - sslv3
* s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
* s->hit - session reuse flag
* s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
*/
/* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
if (!ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s, &al)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
goto f_err;
}
}
wst = WORK_MORE_B;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
int ret;
if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
/*
* callback indicates further work to be done
*/
s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
return WORK_MORE_B;
}
if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
/*
* This is not really an error but the only means to for
* a client to detect whether srp is supported.
*/
if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
else
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
goto f_err;
}
}
#endif
s->renegotiate = 2;
return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned char *p, *d;
int i, sl;
int al = 0;
unsigned long l;
buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
/* Do the message type and length last */
d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
*(p++) = s->version >> 8;
*(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
/*
* Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
* tls_process_client_hello()
*/
memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
/*-
* There are several cases for the session ID to send
* back in the server hello:
* - For session reuse from the session cache,
* we send back the old session ID.
* - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
* is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
* (which doesn't actually identify the session).
* - If it is a new session, we send back the new
* session ID.
* - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
* we send back a 0-length session ID.
* s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
* so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
* to send back.
*/
if (s->session->not_resumable ||
(!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
&& !s->hit))
s->session->session_id_length = 0;
sl = s->session->session_id_length;
if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
*(p++) = sl;
memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
p += sl;
/* put the cipher */
i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
p += i;
/* put the compression method */
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
*(p++) = 0;
#else
if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
*(p++) = 0;
else
*(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
#endif
if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
if ((s->version != GMTLS_VERSION) && (p =
ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
&al)) == NULL) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
/* do the header */
l = (p - d);
if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s)
{
if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
}
}
return 1;
}
int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
int j;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
int encodedlen = 0;
int curve_id = 0;
#endif
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
unsigned char *p, *d;
int al, i;
unsigned long type;
int n;
const BIGNUM *r[4];
int nr[4], kn;
BUF_MEM *buf;
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
if (!(md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new())) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
buf = s->init_buf;
r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
n = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (type & SSL_PSK) {
/*
* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
*/
n += 2;
if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
n += strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
}
/* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
} else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
CERT *cert = s->cert;
EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
DH *dh;
if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
DH_free(dhp);
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
pkdhp = pkdh;
} else {
pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
}
if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
if (pkdh == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
pkdhp = pkdh;
}
if (pkdhp == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
goto f_err;
}
if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
pkdh = NULL;
DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK | SSL_kSM2DHE | SSL_kSM2PSK)) {
int nid;
if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
if (curve_id == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
goto err;
}
s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
/* Generate a new key for this curve */
if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto f_err;
}
/* Encode the public key. */
encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
&encodedPoint);
if (encodedlen == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
/*
* We only support named (not generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key
* exchanges. In this situation, we need four additional bytes to
* encode the entire ServerECDHParams structure.
*/
n += 4 + encodedlen;
/*
* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
* can set these to NULLs
*/
r[0] = NULL;
r[1] = NULL;
r[2] = NULL;
r[3] = NULL;
} else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
(s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
(s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
goto err;
}
r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
} else
#endif
{
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
n += 1 + nr[i];
else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
/*-
* for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
* stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
* as the prime, so use the length of the prime here
*/
if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)))
n += 2 + nr[0];
else
#endif
n += 2 + nr[i];
}
if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
== NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
/* Allow space for signature algorithm */
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
kn += 2;
/* Allow space for signature length */
kn += 2;
} else {
pkey = NULL;
kn = 0;
}
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
goto err;
}
d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (type & SSL_PSK) {
/* copy PSK identity hint */
if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint) {
size_t len = strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
/*
* Should not happen - we already checked this when we set
* the identity hint
*/
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
s2n(len, p);
memcpy(p, s->cert->psk_identity_hint, len);
p += len;
} else {
s2n(0, p);
}
}
#endif
for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
*p = nr[i];
p++;
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
/*-
* for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
* stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
* as the prime
*/
if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
s2n(nr[0], p);
for (j = 0; j < (nr[0] - nr[2]); ++j) {
*p = 0;
++p;
}
} else
#endif
s2n(nr[i], p);
BN_bn2bin(r[i], p);
p += nr[i];
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK | SSL_kSM2DHE | SSL_kSM2PSK)) {
/*
* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
* this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
* CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
* point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
*/
*p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
p += 1;
*p = 0;
p += 1;
*p = curve_id;
p += 1;
*p = encodedlen;
p += 1;
memcpy(p, encodedPoint, encodedlen);
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
encodedPoint = NULL;
p += encodedlen;
}
#endif
/* not anonymous */
if (pkey != NULL) {
/*
* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
* points to the space at the end.
*/
if (md) {
/* send signature algorithm */
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
/* Should never happen */
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
p += 2;
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
if (EVP_SignInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSM2) {
unsigned char z[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
size_t zlen = sizeof(z);
char *id = SM2_DEFAULT_ID;
if (!SM2_compute_id_digest(md, id, strlen(id), z, &zlen,
EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_SM2);
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
if (EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, z, zlen) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_SM2);
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
}
#endif
if (EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
|| EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
|| EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, d, n) <= 0
|| EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, &(p[2]),
(unsigned int *)&i, pkey) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
s2n(i, p);
n += i + 2;
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
n += 2;
}
} else {
/* Is this error check actually needed? */
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
}
if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
return 1;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p, *d;
int i, j, nl, off, n;
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
X509_NAME *name;
BUF_MEM *buf;
buf = s->init_buf;
d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
/* get the list of acceptable cert types */
p++;
n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
d[0] = n;
p += n;
n++;
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
const unsigned char *psigs;
unsigned char *etmp = p;
nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
/* Skip over length for now */
p += 2;
nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl);
/* Now fill in length */
s2n(nl, etmp);
p += nl;
n += nl + 2;
}
off = n;
p += 2;
n += 2;
sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
nl = 0;
if (sk != NULL) {
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
goto err;
}
p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
s2n(j, p);
i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
n += 2 + j;
nl += 2 + j;
}
}
/* else no CA names */
p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
s2n(nl, p);
if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
return 1;
err:
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
size_t psklen;
PACKET psk_identity;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
return 0;
}
if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
psk, sizeof(psk));
if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
} else if (psklen == 0) {
/*
* PSK related to the given identity not found
*/
*al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
return 1;
#else
/* Should never happen */
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
#endif
}
static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
int decrypt_len;
unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
size_t j, padding_len;
PACKET enc_premaster;
RSA *rsa = NULL;
unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
int ret = 0;
rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey);
if (rsa == NULL) {
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
return 0;
}
/* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
enc_premaster = *pkt;
} else {
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return 0;
}
}
/*
* We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
* iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
* (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
* their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
*/
if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
/*
* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
* Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
* section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
* generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
* fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
*/
if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
goto err;
/*
* Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
* the timing-sensitive code below.
*/
decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt(PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
if (decrypt_len < 0)
goto err;
/* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
/*
* The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
* are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
* PS is at least 8 bytes.
*/
if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto err;
}
padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
}
decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
/*
* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
* version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
* Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
* (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
* check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
* constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
*/
version_good =
constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
(unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
version_good &=
constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
(unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
/*
* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
* ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
* protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
* However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
* version instead if the server does not support the requested
* protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
* clients.
*/
if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
unsigned char workaround_good;
workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
(unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
workaround_good &=
constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
(unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
version_good |= workaround_good;
}
/*
* Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
* remain non-zero (0xff).
*/
decrypt_good &= version_good;
/*
* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
* decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
* contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
* it is still sufficiently large to read from.
*/
for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
rand_premaster_secret[j]);
}
if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
return ret;
#else
/* Should never happen */
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
#endif
}
static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
DH *cdh;
unsigned int i;
BIGNUM *pub_key;
const unsigned char *data;
EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
int ret = 0;
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
goto err;
}
skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
if (skey == NULL) {
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto err;
}
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto err;
}
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
/* We already checked we have enough data */
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
if (pub_key != NULL)
BN_free(pub_key);
goto err;
}
if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
return ret;
#else
/* Should never happen */
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
#endif
}
static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
int ret = 0;
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
/* We don't support ECDH client auth */
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
goto err;
} else {
unsigned int i;
const unsigned char *data;
/*
* Get client's public key from encoded point in the
* ClientKeyExchange message.
*/
/* Get encoded point length */
if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
return ret;
#else
/* Should never happen */
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
#endif
}
static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
unsigned int i;
const unsigned char *data;
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
|| !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
return 0;
}
if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
#else
/* Should never happen */
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
#endif
}
static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
const unsigned char *start;
size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
unsigned long alg_a;
int Ttag, Tclass;
long Tlen;
long sess_key_len;
const unsigned char *data;
int ret = 0;
/* Get our certificate private key */
alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
/*
* New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
*/
pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
if (pk == NULL) {
pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
}
if (pk == NULL) {
pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
}
} else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
}
pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/*
* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
* use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
* EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
* client certificate for authorization only.
*/
client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
if (client_pub_pkey) {
if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
ERR_clear_error();
}
/* Decrypt session key */
sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
&Tclass, sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
|| Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto err;
}
start = data;
inlen = Tlen;
if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto err;
}
/* Generate master secret */
if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
ret = 1;
err:
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
return ret;
#else
/* Should never happen */
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
#endif
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
int al = -1;
unsigned long alg_k;
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
/* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
goto err;
if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
/* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
/* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
} else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
goto err;
} else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
goto err;
} else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK | SSL_kSM2DHE | SSL_kSM2PSK)) {
if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
goto err;
} else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
goto err;
} else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
goto err;
} else {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
goto err;
}
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
err:
if (al != -1)
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
#endif
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
/*
* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
* used.
*/
memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
0) <= 0) {
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return WORK_ERROR;;
}
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
}
wst = WORK_MORE_B;
}
if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B)
/* Is this SCTP? */
&& BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
/* Are we renegotiating? */
&& s->renegotiate
/* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
&& (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify)
&& BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
return WORK_MORE_B;
} else {
ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
}
#endif
if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
/*
* No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
* the handshake_buffer
*/
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
} else {
if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
/*
* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
* extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
*/
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return WORK_ERROR;
}
}
return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
const unsigned char *sig, *data;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
#endif
int al, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
int type = 0, j;
unsigned int len;
X509 *peer;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
long hdatalen = 0;
void *hdata;
EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (mctx == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
peer = s->session->peer;
pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
goto f_err;
}
/* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
/*
* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
* length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
&& EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
len = 64;
} else
#endif
{
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
int rv;
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sig, 2)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey);
if (rv == -1) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
} else if (rv == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
} else {
/* Use default digest for this key type */
int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey);
if (idx >= 0)
md = s->s3->tmp.md[idx];
if (md == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
}
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
}
j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
|| (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
if (hdatalen <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
//modify begin 使用gmtls 对从 client hello 消息到 client CertificateVerify 消息（不包括client CertificateVerify消息）所有内容做SM3摘要计算
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
EVP_MD_CTX *mctx1 = NULL;
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSM2)
{
// from client hello to client CertificateVerify(not include CertificateVerify) make sm3
mctx1 = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (mctx1 == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_init(mctx1);
if (!EVP_DigestInit(mctx1, md)
|| EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx1, (unsigned char *)hdata,
hdatalen) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx1, hdata, &hdatalen) <= 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
*(unsigned char *)(hdata + hdatalen) = 0;
}
if (mctx1 != NULL)
EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx1);
#endif
// modify end
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
// modify begin 使用gmtls 从上面得到的SM3摘要结果，还需要使用 SM2_DEFAULT_ID（1234567812345678） 做内部哈希，再签名
if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSM2)
{
// SM2_DEFAULT_ID to assign, when compute CertificateVerify sign
unsigned char z[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
size_t zlen;
char *id = NULL;
id = SM2_DEFAULT_ID;
zlen = sizeof(z);
if (!SM2_compute_id_digest(EVP_sm3(), id, strlen(id), z, &zlen,
EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_SM2_LIB);
goto f_err;
}
if (!EVP_VerifyUpdate(mctx, z, zlen))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto f_err;
}
}
#endif
if (!EVP_VerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto f_err;
}
// modify end
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
{
int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
|| pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
|| pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
data = gost_data;
}
}
#endif
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
&& !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
s->session->master_key_length,
s->session->master_key)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
if (EVP_VerifyFinal(mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
if (0) {
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
}
BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
#endif
return ret;
}
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
X509 *x = NULL;
unsigned long l, llen;
const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
PACKET spkt;
if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
|| !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) {
if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
|| !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
certstart = certbytes;
x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
if (x == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto f_err;
}
if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
x = NULL;
}
if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
/* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
/* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
goto f_err;
}
/* No client certificate so digest cached records */
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
goto f_err;
}
} else {
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
if (i <= 0) {
al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
goto f_err;
}
if (i > 1) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
goto f_err;
}
pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
if (pkey == NULL) {
al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
}
X509_free(s->session->peer);
s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
s->session->peer_chain = sk;
/*
* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
* certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
*/
sk = NULL;
ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
goto done;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
done:
X509_free(x);
sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
return ret;
}
int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s)
{
CERT_PKEY *cpk;
cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
if (cpk == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *senc = NULL;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
unsigned char *p, *macstart;
const unsigned char *const_p;
int len, slen_full, slen;
SSL_SESSION *sess;
unsigned int hlen;
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
int iv_len;
/* get session encoding length */
slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
/*
* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
* long
*/
if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
if (senc == NULL) {
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
p = senc;
if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
goto err;
/*
* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
*/
const_p = senc;
sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
if (sess == NULL)
goto err;
sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
goto err;
}
p = senc;
if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
goto err;
}
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
/*-
* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
* follows handshake_header_length +
* 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
* sizeof(keyname) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
* max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session * length) +
* max_md_size (HMAC) + session_length.
*/
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 6 + sizeof(key_name) +
EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
goto err;
p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
/*
* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
* all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
*/
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
/* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
int ret = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
hctx, 1);
if (ret == 0) {
l2n(0, p); /* timeout */
s2n(0, p); /* length */
if (!ssl_set_handshake_header
(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, p - ssl_handshake_start(s)))
goto err;
OPENSSL_free(senc);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
return 1;
}
if (ret < 0)
goto err;
iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
} else {
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher =
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AES
EVP_aes_256_cbc();
#else
EVP_sms4_cbc();
#endif
iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0)
goto err;
if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
goto err;
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_sha256), NULL))
goto err;
memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name));
}
/*
* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
* for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
* new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
*/
l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
/* Skip ticket length for now */
p += 2;
/* Output key name */
macstart = p;
memcpy(p, key_name, sizeof(key_name));
p += sizeof(key_name);
/* output IV */
memcpy(p, iv, iv_len);
p += iv_len;
/* Encrypt session data */
if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
goto err;
p += len;
if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, p, &len))
goto err;
p += len;
if (!HMAC_Update(hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
goto err;
if (!HMAC_Final(hctx, p, &hlen))
goto err;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
ctx = NULL;
hctx = NULL;
p += hlen;
/* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
/* Total length */
len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
/* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
s2n(len - 6, p);
if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len))
goto err;
OPENSSL_free(senc);
return 1;
err:
OPENSSL_free(senc);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
size_t msglen;
/*-
* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
* follows handshake_header_length +
* 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
* + (ocsp response)
*/
msglen = 4 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + msglen))
goto err;
p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
/* status type */
*(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
/* length of OCSP response */
l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
/* actual response */
memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, msglen))
goto err;
return 1;
err:
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return 0;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
/*
* tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
* It sets the next_proto member in s if found
*/
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
PACKET next_proto, padding;
size_t next_proto_len;
/*-
* The payload looks like:
* uint8 proto_len;
* uint8 proto[proto_len];
* uint8 padding_len;
* uint8 padding[padding_len];
*/
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
|| PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->next_proto_negotiated, &next_proto_len)) {
s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
goto err;
}
s->next_proto_negotiated_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
err:
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
#endif
#define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
PACKET *cipher_suites,
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
int sslv2format, int *al)
{
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
int n;
/* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN];
s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
return NULL;
}
if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return NULL;
}
sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null();
if (sk == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return NULL;
}
if (sslv2format) {
size_t numciphers = PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) / n;
PACKET sslv2ciphers = *cipher_suites;
unsigned int leadbyte;
unsigned char *raw;
/*
* We store the raw ciphers list in SSLv3+ format so we need to do some
* preprocessing to convert the list first. If there are any SSLv2 only
* ciphersuites with a non-zero leading byte then we are going to
* slightly over allocate because we won't store those. But that isn't a
* problem.
*/
raw = OPENSSL_malloc(numciphers * TLS_CIPHER_LEN);
s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = raw;
if (raw == NULL) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto err;
}
for (s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0;
PACKET_remaining(&sslv2ciphers) > 0;
raw += TLS_CIPHER_LEN) {
if (!PACKET_get_1(&sslv2ciphers, &leadbyte)
|| (leadbyte == 0
&& !PACKET_copy_bytes(&sslv2ciphers, raw,
TLS_CIPHER_LEN))
|| (leadbyte != 0
&& !PACKET_forward(&sslv2ciphers, TLS_CIPHER_LEN))) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
OPENSSL_free(raw);
s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = NULL;
s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0;
goto err;
}
if (leadbyte == 0)
s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen += TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
}
} else if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw,
&s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto err;
}
while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) {
/*
* SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
* first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
* first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
*/
if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0')
continue;
/* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
(cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
/* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
if (s->renegotiate) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
goto err;
}
s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
continue;
}
/* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
(cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
/*
* The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
* version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
* downgrade.
*/
if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
*al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
goto err;
}
continue;
}
/* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher);
if (c != NULL) {
if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto err;
}
}
}
if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
*skp = sk;
return sk;
err:
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);
return NULL;
}
重新编译
- sudo ./config --prefix=/usr/local/gmssl --openssldir=/usr/local/gmssl
- sudo make
- sudo make install
- 配置 /etc/profile
- 激活 source /etc/profile
- 验证 gmssl version
成果展示
吉大正元身份认证网关和gmssl客户端之间通信
- gmssl 客户端命令
- gmssl s_client -gmtls -connect 192.168.80.110:8889 -key /home/chy-cpabe/tmp/second/sign.key -cert /home/chy-cpabe/tmp/second/sign.pem -dkey /home/chy-cpabe/tmp/second/encrypt.key -dcert /home/chy-cpabe/tmp/second/encrypt.pem -CAfile /home/chy-cpabe/tmp/second/rootcert.pem -state -verify 3
- -gmtls 协议类型
- -connect 对接端口 其中192.168.80.110:8889 是身份认证网关的地址
- -key 签名私钥
- -cert 签名证书
- -dkey 加密私钥
- -dcert 加密证书
- -CAfile CA证书路径
- -state 状态信息
- -verify 开启国密双证书双向认证
- 1 验证深度，分析源码可知，这个数只是接收并输出，并无关键性影响
chy-cpabe@ubuntu:~$ gmssl s_client -gmtls -connect 192.168.80.110:8889 -key /home/chy-cpabe/tmp/second/sign.key -cert /home/chy-cpabe/tmp/second/sign.pem -dkey /home/chy-cpabe/tmp/second/encrypt.key -dcert /home/chy-cpabe/tmp/second/encrypt.pem -CAfile /home/chy-cpabe/tmp/second/rootcert.pem -state -verify 3
verify depth is 3
[GMTLS_DEBUG] set sm2 signing certificate
[GMTLS_DEBUG] set sm2 signing private key
[GMTLS_DEBUG] set sm2 encryption certificate
[GMTLS_DEBUG] set sm2 decryption private key
CONNECTED(00000003)
SSL_connect:before SSL initialization
SSL_connect:SSLv3/TLS write client hello
SSL_connect:SSLv3/TLS write client hello
SSL_connect:SSLv3/TLS read server hello
depth=1 C = CN, O = SDT, CN = SDTCA SM2
verify return:1
depth=0 C = CN, O = SDT, CN = 192.168.80.110
verify return:1
SSL_connect:SSLv3/TLS read server certificate
Z=57A18ADE9AE65C4518E01851C91150B786FEC8CD4FA1C22DCA623E2D1C4B494D
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
SSL_connect:SSLv3/TLS read server key exchange
SSL_connect:SSLv3/TLS read server certificate request
SSL_connect:SSLv3/TLS read server done
SSL_connect:SSLv3/TLS write client certificate
SSL_connect:SSLv3/TLS write client key exchange
ssl_get_algorithm2=b9cdb00008x
SSL_connect:SSLv3/TLS write certificate verify
SSL_connect:SSLv3/TLS write change cipher spec
SSL_connect:SSLv3/TLS write finished
SSL_connect:SSLv3/TLS write finished
SSL_connect:SSLv3/TLS read change cipher spec
SSL_connect:SSLv3/TLS read finished
---
Certificate chain
0 s:/C=CN/O=SDT/CN=192.168.80.110
i:/C=CN/O=SDT/CN=SDTCA SM2
1 s:/C=CN/O=SDT/CN=192.168.80.110
i:/C=CN/O=SDT/CN=SDTCA SM2
---
Server certificate
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
subject=/C=CN/O=SDT/CN=192.168.80.110
issuer=/C=CN/O=SDT/CN=SDTCA SM2
---
Acceptable client certificate CA names
/C=CN/O=SDT/CN=SDTCA SM2
Client Certificate Types: RSA sign, ECDSA sign
---
SSL handshake has read 1238 bytes and written 1773 bytes
Verification: OK
---
New, GMTLSv1.1, Cipher is SM2-WITH-SMS4-SM3
Server public key is 256 bit
Secure Renegotiation IS NOT supported
Compression: NONE
Expansion: NONE
No ALPN negotiated
SSL-Session:
Protocol : GMTLSv1.1
Cipher : SM2-WITH-SMS4-SM3
Session-ID:
Session-ID-ctx:
Master-Key: 83AEC9F0773CE4364F070F44FCCFFAF4AA6C09090AC71009D67F03313553DABD8E36C4E0AE61CD876B2ED2095EC9A905
PSK identity: None
PSK identity hint: None
SRP username: None
Start Time: 1668134562
Timeout : 7200 (sec)
Verify return code: 0 (ok)
Extended master secret: no
---
SSL3 alert read:warning:close notify
closed
SSL3 alert write:warning:close notify
吉大正元USBKey和gmssl服务端之间通信
参考链接
扫一扫
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